State of Utah v. Kent Karl Kirkwood : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2001
State of Utah v. Kent Karl Kirkwood : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kent R. Hart; Salt Lake Legal Defenders Assoc.; attorney for appellant.
Marian Decker; assistant attorney general; Mark L. Shurtleff; attorney general; Carlos A. Esqueda;
deputy salt lake county attorney; attorneys for appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, State of Utah v. Kent Karl Kirkwood, No. 20010321 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3256
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v., 
KENT KARL KIRKWOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010321-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION 
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON (KNIFE), BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503(2)(a) (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN, PRESIDING 
KENT R. HART 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
KENT KARL KIRKWOOD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010321-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION 
OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON (KNIFE), BY A 
RESTRICTED PERSON, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-
503(2)(a) (1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, THE 
HONORABLE ANTHONY B. QUINN, PRESIDING 
KENT R. HART 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDERS 
ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Ste. 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MARIAN DECKER (5688) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Utah Attorney General 
Heber Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
CARLOS A. ESQUEDA 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 5 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDITIONAL RULING REGARDING 
THE POTENTIAL ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES 
EVIDENCE DID NOT UNFAIRLY FORCE DEFENDANT TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN TAKING THE STAND AND SUBJECTING 
HIMSELF TO CROSS-EXAMINATION, OR NOT TAKING THE 
STAND AND PRECLUDING ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE 6 
A. The Rule of United States v. Luce and State v. Gentry is 
Dispositive: Defendant Waived Any Claim of Error 
Regarding the Trial Court's Conditional Evidentiary 
Ruling When He Declined to Testify 10 
B. The Trial Court Properly Ruled That Cross-Examination 
Regarding Defendant's Prior Illegitimate Use of a Knife 
May be Probative of His Disputed Intent in Possessing the 
Instant Knife 16 
CONCLUSION 19 
ADDENDUM - State v. Kirkwood Trial Transcript 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Luce v.UnitedStates, 469 U.S. 38 (1984) 1,10,11, 13 
United States v. Dimatteo, 759 F.2d 831 (11th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985) 12 
United States v. Griffin, 818 F.2d 97 (1st Cir. 1986), 
cert, denied, 4%4 U.S. 844(1987) 12 
United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 1259 (8th Cir. 1985) 2,11, 14 
United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 498 U.S. 985 (1990) 12 
United States v. Nivica, 887 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1989), 
cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1005(1990) 12, 16 
United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900 (2nd Cir. 1988), 
cert, denied, 489 U.S. 1070 (1989) 2, 11, 14 
United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23 (2nd Cir.), 
cert, denied, 479 U.S. 831 (1986) 12 
STATE CASES 
Pagev. State,125?.2d 1082 (Alaska App. 1986) 2, 11, 14 
State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978) 18 
State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57,993 P.2d 837, 
cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1164(2000) 2 
State v. Gentry, 141 P.2d 1032 (Utah 1987) 2, 11, 16 
State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10 (Me. 1996), 
cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1064(1997) 11, 14 
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982) 17 
ii 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603 (Utah 1985) 17 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353 (Utah 1980) 11,16 
State v. Mead, 200\ UT 58, 27 P.2d 1115 2 
State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990) 18 
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) 18 
State v. Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347 (Utah 1997) 17 
State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366 (Utah 1996) 18 
State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991) 2, 11, 16, 17, 18 
State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 1990) 7 
State v. Wickham, 796 P.2d 1354 (Alaska 1990) 11 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-501 (1999) 2,3 
Utah Code Ann. §76-10-503 (1999) 1, 3 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996 & Supp. 2001) 1 
Utah R. Evid. 402 3, 15 
UtahR. Evid. 403 3, 12, 15, 17, 18 
Utah R. Evid. 404 passim 
UtahR. Evid. 609 passim 
• •» 
H I 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 20010321-CA 
v. : 
KENT KARL KIRKWOOD, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a jury conviction for possession of a dangerous weapon 
(knife) by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-10-503(2)(a) (1999). This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Did the trial court's conditional ruling on the potential admissibility of other 
crimes evidence unfairly force defendant to choose between testifying and subjecting 
himself to cross-examination, or not testifying in order to ensure that evidence of his 
prior bad acts was excluded? 
No standard of review applies. Because defendant ultimately chose not to testify, 
no evidence regarding his prior illegitimate use of a knife was admitted, and any issue 
concerning the trial court's conditional evidentiary ruling is therefore waived. Luce v. 
United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984); State v. Gentry, 1M P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 
1987); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Utah App. 1991) (all applying waiver rule to 
claim of potential improper impeachment with a prior conviction). See also Page v. 
State, 725 P.2d 1082, 1086) (Alaska App. 1986); United States v. Ortiz, 857 F.2d 900 
(2nd Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 489 U.S.1070 (1989); United States v. Johnson, 767 F.2d 
1259, 1269-1270 (8th Cir. 1985) (all extending waiver rule to claim of alleged potential 
improper use of prior crimes, wrongs and acts evidence). 
However, if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve his claim 
by testifying, the trial court's conditional evidentiary ruling should not be overturned 
unless the ruling exceeded the trial court's discretion. See State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 
33 n.4, 27 P.2d 1115; State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, f 18, 993 P.2d 837, cert, denied, 
528 U.S. 1164(2000). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-501(4)(a) (1999): 
"Dangerous weapon" means any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury. The 
following factors shall be used in determining whether a knife, or any other 
item, object, or thing not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a 
dangerous weapon: 
(i) the character of the instrument, object, or thing; 
(ii) the character of the wound produced, if any; 
(iii) the manner in which the instrument, object, or thing was used; and 
(iv) the other lawful purposes for which the instrument, object, or thing 
may be used. 
2 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(a) (1999): 
Any person who is on parole or probation for a felony may not have in his 
possession or under his custody or control any . . . dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-10-501. 
Utah R. Evid. 404(b): 
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident. In other words, evidence 
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-character 
purpose and meets the requirements of Rules 402 and 403. 
Utah R. Evid. 609(a): 
General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, 
(1) evidence that a witness other than the accused has been convicted of a 
crime shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by 
death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the 
witness was convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of 
such a crime shall be admitted if the court determines that the probative 
value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the 
accused; and 
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be 
admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the 
punishment. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of a dangerous weapon 
(knives), both third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-503(2)(a) 
(1999) (R4-5). Following a one-day jury trial held on 24 January 2001, defendant was 
acquitted of one count and convicted of the other (R140). The trial court imposed the 
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statutory zero-to-five-year term, consecutive to any other terms defendant may be serving 
(R158). Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal (R165). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was on probation for robbery on 30 August 2000, when two officers 
from Adult Probation and Parole performed a routine probation search of his home 
(Rl 88:28-29). While searching defendant's bedroom, the officers found two knives 
(Rl 88:32, 36-37). As a restricted person, defendant could not properly possess any knife 
for any purpose other than as an eating utensil or tool (Rl 88:40,43-46).1 
The first knife was found on a bedside table in defendant's bedroom (Rl88:32). 
The knife had "a blade around four inches [long], curving on the end and the handle 
[was] either wood or bone" (Rl 88:32). Defendant claimed that he used the knife for 
eating, but the officers found no food or leftovers in the room and no food remnants on 
the knife itself (Rl 88:33, 56-57, 66). Defendant knew that "kitchen knives belong[ed] in 
the kitchen and if they were anywhere else, they would be considered a weapon" 
(Rl 88:34-35). 
The second knife was found in a gym bag within reach of defendant's bed 
(Rl 88:37, 65). The knife had a three-inch, serrated blade and a rubber handle (id.). 
Defendant claimed that this knife belonged "to a friend," but defendant could not 
'Defendant was not charged with possessing two knife-too I combinations seized 
from his bedside table and from a tool box in his room (Rl88:69) (Exhs. ##F-E). 
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identify his "friend" for the officers (Rl 88:38, 67). The gym bag did not contain any 
information identifying its owner (Rl88:66). 
Defendant was convicted for possessing the first knife found on the bedside table, 
but was acquitted of possessing the second knife found in the gym bag (R140). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is well established that before a defendant can complain on appeal about 
improper impeachment with a prior conviction, he must testify. The need for the full 
development of an adequate record for purposes of appellate review is equally 
compelling where, as here, a defendant alleges potential improper use of prior crimes, 
wrongs, and acts evidence. Therefore, because defendant did not ultimately testify, he 
waived any claim of error based on the trial court's conditional ruling, that if he testified, 
the prosecutor "may"cross-examine him about his prior illegitimate use of a knife. 
In any event, even if the Court were to overlook defendant's failure to preserve his 
claim here, the trial court did not exceed its discretion in making the conditional ruling. 
Defendant's intent in possessing the instant knife was a disputed issue and the State 
lacked any direct evidence of his intent. Therefore, evidence of defendant's prior illicit 
use of a knife would have been highly probative. Finally, the jury was already 
necessarily aware that defendant was a felon; thus, any additional prejudice would have 
been slight. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT'S CONDITIONAL RULING REGARDING 
THE POTENTIAL ADMISSIBILITY OF OTHER CRIMES 
EVIDENCE DID NOT UNFAIRLY FORCE DEFENDANT TO 
CHOOSE BETWEEN TAKING THE STAND AND SUBJECTING 
HIMSELF TO CROSS-EXAMINATION, OR NOT TAKING THE 
STAND AND PRECLUDING ADMISSION OF THE EVIDENCE 
At the close of the State's case-in-chief, and after noting that defendant's intent 
was a disputed issue, the trial court conditionally ruled that it "may" allow the prosecutor 
to cross-examine defendant about his use of a knife in committing his prior conviction if 
defendant chose to testify (Rl88:72). Defendant claims the ruling exceeded the trial 
court's discretion and unfairly kept him from testifying. Aplt. Br. at 2. 
However, defendant's choice not to testify successfully precluded admission of 
this highly probative evidence (Rl 88:75). Defendant's appellate challenge is therefore 
improper. In choosing not to testify, defendant failed to develop an adequate record for 
appellate review and waived any claim of error based on the trial court's conditional 
ruling. 
Proceedings Below.2 The admissibility of defendant's prior illegitimate use of 
knife arose during the testimony of Officer Hansen. Defendant acknowledged to Officer 
Hansen that he was not supposed to have the knife she found in his bedroom, and 
explained to her that he "brought it into his room the night before when he was eating" 
A complete copy of the trial transcript (R188), is contained in the addendum. 
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(Rl88:32). On cross-examination defense counsel elicited from Officer Hansen that 
probationers can legitimately use a knife for eating purposes (Rl 88:40). Defense counsel 
also successfully introduced two knife-tool combinations found in the defendant's room, 
but for which he was not charged (Rl88:43-45). Finally, defense counsel elicited that 
Officer Hansen's classification of a knife as a permissible tool or as an impermissible 
weapon was based on its intended use (Rl 88:45-47). 
On redirect the prosecutor clarified that Officer Hansen distinguished the knife-
tool combinations as having arguably legitimate purposes, whereas the two non-tool 
knives found in defendant's possession did not (Rl 88:48). Following a side-bar, the 
proceedings continued outside the presence of the jury with the trial court stating as 
follows: 
. . . Okay. I- -I think I understand [the prosecutor's] argument. Ordinarily, 
the nature of the underlying offense and what was used to commit the 
underlying offense would be of no concern in this trial; but the distinction 
that you've tried to make here is between these knives- -between knives as 
weapons and knives as tools. 
And it strikes me that [the prosecutor] has a good argument that- -
with respect to [defendant], that he intended to possess a knife was a 
weapon because of his use of knife in this prior felony. 
Let me hear what your response to that is. 
(Rl 88:49). Defense counsel argued that under State v. Tucker, 800 P.2d 819 (Utah App. 
1990), unless defendant opened the door, the prosecutor could not inquire into the details 
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of defendant's prior robbery conviction, and that another witness could not open the door 
for defendant (id.). 
The trial court responded that in "making this a big thing about the distinction 
between- -or the fact that a knife can also be a tool," defendant "opened the door" to the 
issue whether the knives were intended to be used as weapons (Rl 88:50-51). The trial 
court further observed that "what this requires us to do is really look into [defendant's] 
mind and determine whether he intended to possess this knife as a weapon or for some 
other purpose" (Rl 88:52). Noting that the evidence "shed[] some light" on defendant's 
intent, and that it was also "real prejudicial," the trial court ultimately determined that 
Officer Hansen lacked sufficient personal information to testify that defendant had in fact 
used a knife to commit the robbery for which he was then on probation (Rl 88:53-55). 
The prosecutor's continued redirect examination of Officer Hansen established 
that she observed no plates, food, crumbs, or other indications that defendant used the 
four-inch knife blade seized from his bedside table for eating purposes (Rl88:56). 
Further, defendant had not claimed to use the knife as tool (FU 88:57). Rather, when 
asked if defendant claimed to use the knife "at his employment," Officer Hansen stated, 
"No. [Defendant] was unemployed"(i7/.). 
After the State rested, and outside the jury's presence, the trial court elaborated on 
its initial ruling prohibiting the prosecutor from asking Officer Hansen about the details 
of defendant's robbery conviction (Rl 88:70). 
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There is one- -I would like to express myself more fully on the 
evidentiary issue that came up with respect to whether or not [the 
prosecutor] is entitled to put on evidence of the prior crime involving a 
knife. 
First- -the first question that I- -I have to address is whether or not 
that's relevant to all of these proceedings and it seems to be it is relevant, 
it's not overwhelmingly relevant. What- -the- -the issue that we're trying 
to decide in this case is whether or not [defendant's] possession of a knife 
was intended to be possession of a weapon or possession of a tool. 
If you had a hundred people, hundred convicted felons that all had 
in their possession a knife, I think that the intent to possess that knife as a 
weapon would be somewhat greater for those felons who had used knives 
in prior crimes. And so for that reason, I find it to be relevant. 
The next issue is whether the relevance of that information is 
substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect on this case. And it's not 
prejudicial just because it helps the State establish its case, it has to be 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Now, we've already admitted in this case that [defendant] is a 
convicted felon. Nine-tenths of the prejudice that [defendant] suffers as a 
result of this information coming in, he already suffers as the result of the 
fact that one of the elements in this case is his prior conviction of a felony 
and that's been admitted. 
The additional prejudice that he res- -that he experiences as a result 
of the jury learning that that prior conviction involved the use of a knife is 
only a slight increase in prejudice and really, it does go to establishing his 
intent with respect to the possession of these items. And I think it's made 
more relevant in this case and [the prosecutor] has talked about opening the 
door. 
The relevance is- -of that information is increased in this case in 
light of the defense's arguments that this is but one of a number of tools 
that [defendant] possessed and he did not intend to possess it as a weapon. 
We dodged the bullet with respect to Ms. Hansen's testimony 
because I ruled that with respect to her testimony, she lacked sufficient 
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personal knowledge to make that- -to testify, as far as the circumstances of 
the prior crime. 
That still may come up in other context [sic] and for that reason, 
[defense counsel], I think you want to think carefully about whether or not 
[defendant] should testify because he obviously has information about- -he 
has personal knowledge with respect to his prior crime. 
(Rl 88:70-72). 
The trial court also distinguished defendant's reliance on Tucker, clarifying that 
he would "not allow discussion of the knife to come in for purposes of impeachment" 
(Rl 88:73). Rather, evidence as to the knife was admissible "for whatever relevance and 
whatever light that it may shed on [defendant's] intent with possessing these particular 
items" {id.). While the trial court did not *expressly invoke rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, the trial court's recognition that details of defendant's prior crime may be 
admissible as probative of defendant's disputed intent in this case is consistent with the 
rule. 
Thereafter, defendant elected not to testify and rested his case without calling any 
witnesses (Rl88:75). 
A* The Rule of United States v. Luce and State v. Gentry is 
Dispositive: Defendant Waived Any Claim of Error 
Regarding the Trial Court's Conditional Evidentiary 
Ruling When He Declined to Testify. 
On appeal, defendant no longer claims that the trial court's conditional ruling 
violates Tucker, Nor could he, given his failure to testify. It is well established that to 
"preserve for appellate review a claim of improper impeachment with a prior conviction, 
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a defendant must testify:' State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 567 (Utah App. 1991) (quoting 
State v. Gentry, 747 P.2d 1032, 1036 (Utah 1987). In adopting this rule, the Utah 
Supreme Court followed the lead of the United States Supreme Court, agreeing that 
[rjequiring that a defendant testify in order to preserve Rule 609(a),[Utah 
Rules of Evidence] claims, will enable the reviewing court to determine the 
impact any erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a 
whole; it will also tend to discourage making such motions solely to 'plant' 
reversible error in the event of conviction. 
Gentry, 747 P.2d at 1035 (quoting Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 42 (1984)). See 
State v. McCumber, 622 P.2d 353, 358 (Utah 1980) (prc-Luce/Gentry case recognizing 
that a criminal defendant who exercises his constitutional right to remain silent and not 
testify cannot be heard to complain that the court forced that choice upon him when it 
denied his motion in limine to exclude testimony relating to his prior convictions). See 
also State v. Wickham, 796 P.2d 1354, 1356 n. 5 (Alaska 1990) (collecting cases and 
observing majority of state courts have adopted Luce). 
While Gentry and Luce are rule 609(a) impeachment cases, other jurisdictions 
have extended Luce to preliminary or conditional rulings based on rule 404(b). See 
Page v. State, 725 P.2d 1082, 1086) (Alaska App. 1986); United States v. Ortiz, 857 
F.2d 900 (2nd Cir. 1988), cert denied, 489 U.S. 1070 (1989); United States v. Johnson, 
161 F.2d 1259, 1269-1270 (8th Cir. 1985). Cf. State v. Huntley, 681 A.2d 10, 13 (Me. 
1996) (not citing or seeking to extend Luce authority, but similarly rejecting on waiver 
grounds non-testifying defendant's claim that trial court's preliminary rule 404(b) ruling 
U 
chilled his constitutional right to testify), cert, denied, 519 U.S. 1064 (1997). Luce has 
also been extended to rules 403 and 608(b). See United States v. Johnson, 903 F.2d 
1219, 1222 (9th Cir.), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 985 (1990); United States v. Griffin, 818 
F.2d 97, 102-06 (1st Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 844 (1987) (rule 403) (both rule 
403); United States v. Weichert, 783 F.2d 23, 25 (2nd Cir.) (per curiam), cert, denied, 
479 U.S. 831 (1986); United States v. Dimatteo, 759 F.2d 831, 832-833 (11th Cir.), cert, 
denied, 474 U.S. 860 (1985) (both rule 608(b)). See also United States v. Nivica, 887 
F.2d 1110, 1115-1117 (1st Cir. 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1005 (1990) (defendant 
sought advance ruling that if he took the stand, cross-examination would be limited to 
the scope of direct and to questions bearing on credibility; motion was denied, but 
defendant never testified or asked for voir dire; ruling held not appealable). 
Because the policies addressed in Luce are virtually indistinguishable from those 
arising here, extension of the Luce/Gentry rule to this rule 404(b) context is sound. As 
the United States Supreme Court observed in Luce, if Luce had "testified and been 
impeached by evidence of a prior conviction," the decision to admit the impeachment 
evidence would have been reviewable because the appellate court "would then have had 
a complete record detailing the nature of [Luce's] testimony, the scope of the cross-
examination, and the possible impact of the impeachment on the jury's verdict." Id. at 
41. 
12 
However, where, as here and in Luce, the defendant does not choose to testify and 
risk admission of the alleged potentially improper evidence, appellate review is neither 
assured nor warranted. This is because review of the "subtle evidentiary questions" is 
unavoidably "handicapped" by the lack of a "factual context." Id. Luce accordingly 
notes several specific concerns which militate against appellate review of claimed 
conditional evidentiary error. 469 U.S. at 41. 
First, rule 609(a) requires courts to weigh the probative value of a prior conviction 
against its prejudicial effect. This required weighing cannot be performed without 
knowing the "precise nature of the defendant's testimony," and this cannot be known if 
the defendant does not testify. Luce, 469 U.S. at 41. 
Second, the Supreme Court observed that "[a]ny possible harm flowing from a 
district court's in limine ruling permitting impeachment by a prior conviction is wholly 
speculative." Id. Indeed, conditional rulings are necessarily subject to change as a case 
progresses, "particularly if the actual testimony differs from what was contained in the 
defendant's proffer." Id. The Supreme Court further observed that, "even if nothing 
unexpected happens at trial, the district judge is free in the exercise of sound judicial 
discretion, to alter a previous in limine ruling." Id. Thus, "it would be a matter of 
conjecture" whether the lower court would have ultimately allowed the defendant to be 
impeached with a prior conviction, and/or if the prosecution would have ultimately 
sought to impeach with a prior conviction. Id. at 41-42. 
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Third, a defendant's decision to testify "seldom turns on the resolution of one 
factor." Id. at 42 (quotation omitted). Therefore, appellate courts "cannot assume that 
the adverse ruling motivated a defendant's decision not to testify." Id. While a 
defendant "might"commit to testify if the in limine motion is granted, the Supreme Court 
recognized that "such a commitment is virtually risk free because of the difficulty of 
enforcing it." Id. 
Finally, even if each of the above difficulties could be surmounted in an 
individual case, the appellate court "would still face the question of harmless error." Id. 
Unless a defendant is required to testify in order to preserve his challenge, "almost any 
error would result in the windfall of an automatic reversal; the appellate court could not 
logically term 'harmless' an error that presumptively kept the defendant from testifying." 
Id. However, if the defendant testifies the appellate court can "determine the impact any 
erroneous impeachment may have had in light of the record as a whole; it will also tend 
to discourage making such motions solely to 'plant' reversible error in the event of a 
conviction." Id. 
The record development concerns Luce notes are just as compelling in the case of 
undeveloped rule 404(b) evidence. See Page, 725 P.2d at 1086; Huntley, 681 A.2d at 
13; Ortiz, 857 P.2d at 905-06; Johnson, 161 F.2d at 1269-1270. Just like rule 609(a), 
rule 404(b) requires weighing of the probative and prejudicial effect. See Utah R. Evid. 
404(b) ("... evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for a non-
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character purpose and meets the requirements Rules 402 and 403).3 Moreover, 
defendant's claim of harm is as speculative as the claims in Luce and Gentry, given that 
the challenged knife evidence was never revealed to the jury. While defendant's choice 
not to testify was likely due to the trial court's conditional ruling (defense counsel told 
the jury defendant would testify in opening statement (see Rl 88:25)), this one factor is 
itself insufficient to override the remaining and legitimate concerns about the adequacy 
of the record for meaningful appellate review. 
Indeed, this case and each of the other cases extending Luce similarly involve 
evidence held to be conditionally admissible. The trial court in each instance ruled that it 
could only be introduced if a subsequent event occurred (e.g., if the defendants in Luce, 
Page, Huntley, Nivica or Johnson (9th Cir.), testified). And in each instance the merits 
of the evidentiary ruling necessarily depended upon further factual development. None 
of these conditional rulings were capable of meaningful resolution in the vacuum created 
by the defendants' failure to testify. Ultimately, the lower court decisions in this case, 
the Johnson cases, Page, Huntley, Ortiz, Griffin, Nivica, Weichert, and Dimatteo, 
3Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence provides as follows: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
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whatever their initial inclination, depended on the development of a "specific record." 
Nivica, 887 F.2d at 1117. 
In sum, Utah already applies Luce to conditional rule 609(a) impeachment rulings. 
Gentry, 141 P.2d at 1035; Taylor, 818 P.2d at 567 n.4. Further, the record development 
concerns addressed in Luce are equally applicable in this conditional rule 404(b) setting. 
This Court should therefore extend the Luce/Gentry rule and hold that defendant waived 
his right to challenge the trial court's conditional admissibility mling when he declined to 
testify and risk potential cross-examination regarding his prior criminal use of a knife. 
See McCumber, 622 P.2d at 358. 
B. The Trial Court Properly Ruled That Cross-Examination 
Regarding Defendant's Prior Illegitimate Use of a Knife 
May be Probative of His Disputed Intent in Possessing the 
Instant Knife. 
In any event, even if the Court were to overlook the sound record concerns for 
applying the Luce/Gentry waiver rule in this rule 404(b) context, the trial court did not 
exceed its discretion in conditionally ruling that it "may" allow cross-examination 
regarding defendant's prior criminal use of a knife if he chose to testify (R188:72). 
Indeed, rule 404(b) expressly provides for the admission of prior crimes to show intent, a 
disputed issue in this case (see Rl 88:25, 86). 
Significantly, defendant acknowledges that "defense counsel alerted the jury that 
[defendant] claimed that he used the knife for eating and to cut tape." Aplt. Br. at 19 
Indeed, defense counsel's opening statement clearly disputed that defendant had any 
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illegitimate purpose in possessing the knife (Rl88:25). Moreover, defendant told Officer 
Hansen he possessed the knife found by his bedside for eating purposes (Rl 88:32). And 
defense counsel cross-examined Officer Hansen regarding possible legitimate uses for 
the knife which were consistent with defendant's explanation (Rl 88:40, 43-47). Given 
these circumstances, evidence regarding defendant's prior criminal use of a knife was 
arguably admissible in the State's case-in-chief as probative of defendant's disputed 
intent, assuming the trial court's foundational concerns had been met (see Rl88:53-55, 
72). See Taylor, 818 P.2d at 568, n 4, 569-572 (holding claim of error under rule 609 
was waived, but that defendant's prior arrest and conviction was properly admitted in 
State's case-in-chief under rules 403, and 404(b)).4 
Therefore, if defendant had testified and further disputed his intent, cross-
examination regarding his prior illegitimate use of a knife would have been both proper 
and highly probative. See, e.g., State v.Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Utah 1997); 
State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985); State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942, 
4Defendant complains extensively that the trial court failed to made adequate 
inquiry regarding the details of his prior criminal use of a knife before making the 
conditional evidentiary ruling. See, e.g.9 Aplt. Br. at 13-16, 18. However, the trial court 
vigilantly ruled that because Officer Hansen gained her knowledge of the robbery solely 
from the pre-sentence report she lacked sufficient personal knowledge to testify 
regarding defendant's use of a knife (Rl 88:53-55, 72). In so ruling, the trial court 
recognized that defendant, on the other hand, was uniquely possessed of information 
regarding the critical details of the robbery (Rl 88:72). Therefore, as explained in part A, 
supra, any paucity of detail is attributable solely to defendant, who ultimately declined to 
testify and risk cross-examination. 
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944 (Utah 1982); State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135, 136 (Utah 1978); State v. Ramirez, 924 
P.2d 366, 369 (Utah App. 1996); State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700-701 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 292, 296 (Utah App. 
1990). 
Further, while evidence about defendant's prior criminal use of a knife would 
have also been prejudicial, it would not have been "unfairly prejudicial" (Rl 88:71). See 
Rule 403. As recognized by the trial court, evidence of defendant's status as a felon was 
already necessarily before the jury as an element of this status offense; therefore, any 
additional prejudice from cross-examination regarding his use of a knife to commit the 
prior robbery would have been "slight" (Rl 88:72). 
Moreover, defendant concedes that the State, "lacked direct evidence of [his] 
intent." Aplt. Br. at 23. Thus, the State's need for the knife evidence, assuming 
defendant testified and attempted to explain away his possession of the knife, was more 
than "minimal." Taylor, 818 P.2d at 571 (rejecting claim of that rule 404(b) evidence 
was unfairly prejudicial where State lacked direct evidence of guilt). 
Defendant's chief complaint is that he was not able to put his explanation before 
the jury himself. Aplt. Br. at 26 ("Had the jury heard from [defendant], it likely would 
have decided the verdict differently"). However, the jury was aware of defendant's 
theory (see, e.g., Rl 88:32, 40, 43-47), and defense counsel argued defendant's theory of 
legitimate possession in opening statement and closing argument (see, e.g., Rl88:25, 86). 
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Given this circumstance, and that the evidence defendant complains about was never 
ultimately admitted here, any claim of unfair prejudice is necessarily speculative and 
should be rejected on that ground. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, defendant's felony conviction for possession of a dangerous 
weapon by a restricted person should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on Z 3 October 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
MARIAN DECKER 
Assistant Attorney General 
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1 P R O C E F p i N G S 
2 I 
3 THE COURT: Good morning. 
4 MR. ESQUEDA: Good morning. 
5 THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the case of 
6 State of Utah vs. Kent Karl KirKwood, Case No. 001915175. 
7 Mr. Kirkwood is present, represented in this case 
8 by Clayton Simms and Carlos Esqueda represents the State of 
9 Utah. 
10 We're set today for a jury trial on two charges, 
11 both of which are purchase or possession of a dangerous 
12 ]weapon by a restricted person, a third-degree felony. 
13 Counsel, are there any matters that you'd like to 
14 bring up before we bring up the jury? 
15 MR. ESQUEDA: I don't have any, Judge. 
16 MR. SIMMS: We—we do have just one minor issue. 
17 On the jury instructions, your Honor last time sort of 
18 hinted that you weren't going to give the sort of right to 
19 bear arms jury instruction and it may alter our defense. 
20 So, I don't know if you would like to hear our argument now 
21 on that. I know that your Honor denied the motion, but—in 
22 I terms of giving the jury instructions. 
23 I THE COURT: Sure. Go ahead. 
24 MR. SIMMS: Your Honor should have two jury 
25 I instructions, one being from the U.S. Constitution stating 
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a well-regulated militia being necessary to security—the 
security of a free state, the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms shall not be infringed. 
And then the other jury instruction is quoted 
from the Utah Constitution. It is the individual right of 
the people of Utah to keep and bear arms for security and 
defense of self, family, others, property or the state as 
well as for other lawful purpose shall not be infringed, 
but nothing herein shall prevent the legislature from 
defining the lawful use of arms. 
We requested those two jury instructions and it 
may alter our—our~the course of the trial, depending on 
if those come in or not. 
THE COURT: And I indicated before that my 
inclination is not to give those jury instructions. I 
don't think that it's helpful for the jury in deciding this 
case, neither of those instructions have application to a 
restricted person and it's my recollection, although I 
can't—I can't lay my hands on the case, maybe I could if I 
reviewed the Advanced Reports; but my recollection is that 
since we heard the motion in this case, that one of the 
appellate courts has—has, in essence, affirmed that 
position. 
Are—are you aware of that case, Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, your Honor, and it was argued-
-we argued this in—in a motion to dismiss and essentially 
these instructions are the motion to dismiss and you've 
already denied that. 
I'm trying to find the case and I thought I had 
it right on top. And I don't recall the name of the case, 
Judge, but your reference to that is correct and I think 
that was part of your ruling as well, in the motion to 
dismiss; but I do not have that particular case with me. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's get the jury on 
this case and while the bailiff is doing that, it's my 
recollection that before our attempted trial last time, we 
worked out a stipulation that we were going to provide to 
the jury on—with respect to Mr. Kirkwood's status as a 
restricted person. 
I didn't write it down at that time. I've 
written something down this morning. Let me ask each of 
you if this is in accordance with the stipulation that we 
reached. This is what I would tell the juror—jury: 
Kent Karl Kirkwood was a restricted person by 
reason of the fact that he was on probation as the result 
of his conviction of the crime of robbery, a second-degree 
felony. 
MR. ESQUEDA: That's correct. My only question 
is, I still wanted to submit the judgment and conviction as 
my exhibit. 
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MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, our concern with that 
last one was, it said aggravated robbery, which is 
incorrect. He pled to robbery, but this says aggravated 
robbery, so we would object as it being a misstatement of 
what he pled to. 
MR. ESQUEDA: It does appear that there is a 
typographical error that we could remedy, but this is the 
actual docket, this is what is in the court file. 
THE COURT: Well, I think with the stipulation, 
we don't even need to do that. I think it would be 
cumulative. Is—is there any—I mean, we're already going 
to tell the jury that this is something that they need to 
accept as true. 
MR. ESQUEDA: That's fine. 
THE COURT: So, I'm not sure what that would add. 
If there— 
MR. ESQUEDA: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. SIMMS: And—and your instruction was is that 
he is—he was cur—he's currently on probation for the 
robbery? 
THE COURT: This—this is what I was going to 
tell them, I'll just read it again. Kent Karl Kirkwood was 
a restricted person by reason of the fact that he was on 
probation—maybe I could put at all relevant times—that 
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he, at all relevant times, was on probation as a result of 
his conviction of the crime of robbery, a second-degree 
felony. 
MR. ESQUEDA: That's fine. 
THE COURT: Is that okay with you, Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Do you each still have the proposed 
jury instructions that I handed out last time? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Was that your—your copy that you 
created? 
THE COURT: Yeah. 
MR. ESQUEDA: I—I don't— 
MR. SIMMS: I have. 
THE COURT: Let me—let me heive some more of 
those made. Maybe you can have Amber make those and then 
put the tabs back on them. 
I received a requested voir dire from the State. 
I haven't received any from defense; is that—is that 
accurate? Have you submitted any? 
MR. SIMMS: We haven't submitted any voir dire. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, I'm sorry, Judge, I do, I 
just mislabeled them. I do have my copy. 
THE COURT: Well, maybe I'll stop that from being 
(inaudible) I'll be back in just a second. 
8 
Counsel, just for your information, when the jury 
comes in, I'm going to have them seated primarily on the 
left side of the courtroom. Maybe we can have the— 
everybody—both of you sit on the front row, right behind 
Mr. Esqueda so that we have plenty of seats for the jurors 
when they come in. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Are you going to use this as well? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Okay. 
THE COURT: And then when we seat them in the 
front, we're going to start here at the left, that will be 
Juror No. 1. We'll go across the front row and then across 
the second row and across the third row. 
And the list that you have been provided or 
should have been provided of the jurors is already 
randomized. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Okay. And we have that. 
(Off the record.) 
THE COURT: Good morning. We are back on the 
record in the case of State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood. 
We are here in the presence of counsel, the defendant and 
the jury panel. I would particularly like to welcome the 
members of the jury panel this morning, welcome to the 
Third District Court. My name is Judge Anthony Quinn. 
We are here today to engage in a process that's 
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central to our Constitutional system, that is, the peaceful 
resolution of a legal dispute. We cannot resolve the guilt 
or innocence of individuals who have been charged with 
crimes without the voluntary service of individuals such as 
yourselves who are willing to work as jurors in these 
cases. 
I know that all of you have other important 
things that you could be doing today and I'm going to be as 
respectful as possible of your time. The thing that we are 
going to first of all do this morning, is select eight of 
you to serve as jurors to try this case. The way that we 
are going to do that is, we are going to be asking each of 
you a number of nosy questions where we're going to ask you 
to tell us something about your background and experiences. 
Those questions have two purposes. First of all, 
we want to make sure that each of you meet the statutory 
qualifications to serve as jurors in the State of Utah. 
And secondly, we want to find c_c if there's anything about 
your background that would make it particularly hard for 
you to be fair and impartial in a case such as the one 
we're going to try today. 
I know that if any of you were selected to serve 
on this jury, you would do your best to be fair and 
impartial; but the fact remains that none of us can be fair 
in every case. Sometimes a case is too close to our own 
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experiences for us to have sufficient distance to factor 
out our own biases and our own experiences. And the 
parties in this case need a jury that's as free as humanly 
possible from any bias, prejudice or outside influence 
whatsoever. 
The first thing we are going to do is, we are 
going to have you seated in the front of the courtroom in 
particular order. The clerk will read your names and when 
your name is read, come forward and take a seat that will 
be indicated by the bailiff. 
Once you're all seated, we'll place you under 
oath and I'll begin the questioning. 
(Whereupon, the jury voir dire was recorded but 
not recorded.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, is that the jury that 
you selected? 
MR. ESQUEDA: It is, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Is that the jury, Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: It is, Judge. 
THE COURT: Any reason that the jury should not 
be empaneled at this time? 
MR. SIMMS: No. 
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: I'm sorry, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Any reason the jury should not be 
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empaneled? 
MR. ESQUEDA: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. The rest of you, we are going 
to excuse at this time with our thanks for the time that 
you've spent. We could not have tried this case without 
you, you're just as important to the resolution of this 
case as those who were selected; but the good news is, you 
get to go home and they have to stay. 
Please stand while we excuse the balance of the 
panel. 
All except for the jurors may be seated and we'll 
ask the jurors to take the oath. 
(Whereupon, the jury panel was duly sworn by the 
clerk of the Court.) 
THE COURT: As promised, we are going to take our 
morning break at this time. We're going to take about a 
15-minute break. It's my hope that we can start again 
directly at 10:30. 
The bailiff is going to show you to a jury room, 
which will be your home away from home for the remainder of 
your service. After each break, make sure that you're in 
the jury room together, so that we can bring you into the 
courtroom at the same time. 
You'll find in the jury room that there's a phone 
that you can use to call anybody that you need to let know 
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that you're going to be tied up here for the rest of the 
day. There's also restroom facilities available in that 
room. 
While we're on this break and while we're on 
every break during the course of this trial, you're going 
to get very tired of hearing me say this: Please don't 
form or express any opinion about the case, do not discuss 
the case with each other or allow anyone to discuss the 
case in your presence. 
Please stand while we excuse the jury for their 
break. 
Be seated* 
Counsel, is there anything that we need to do 
outside the jury's presence, prior to opening arguments? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Just invoke the exclusionary rule, 
Judge. I notice that Mr. Simms, I believe his witnesses 
are here. I have Officer Poor, who's also present and the 
only request I have is that I have assistance with Ms. 
Hansen present, as my agent. 
THE COURT: All right. That motion is granted. 
We'll allow Ms. Hansen to stay. Each of the other 
witnesses will be required to leave the courtroom during 
the opening statement and also during all the testimony. 
I'm also going to ask that you not discuss the 
case with each other or your testimony with anybody, until 
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the conclusion of the trial. 
Anything else, Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: Your—there is—there is one other 
issue. 
I was handed this morning a probation agreement 
that's purported to be an agreement that Mr. Kirkwood 
signed. I don't know if the State is going to offer to 
admit this, but if they do, rather than objecting in the 
middle of the trial, I would like to object now. And— 
because I think that there's a lot of things on this 
probation agreement that would be prejudicial; talk of sort 
of obtaining your G.E.D., alcohol testing, drug testing, . 
chemical analysis, all that—all of the terms of probation, 
I don't think are relevant to this particular crime. 
I think that, first of all, the jury's likely to 
get confused that this is some type of probation violation, 
which it isn't. It's a separate crime. It's separate from 
an order to show cause that Mr. Kirkwood may have in 
another court. 
We've already stipulated that he—that he's on 
probation. I don't know if this is necessary. 
THE COURT: Yeah. Let me hear from Mr. Esqueda 
what the relevance of this is. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, the relevance is, in 
Condition No. 4, it specifically says no weapons. You 
14 
know, I—I told Mr. Simms I don't know if I'm going to 
admit this, I'm not going to admit this in my case in 
chief; however, if the defendant gets on the stand, it may 
become relevant. 
First of all, the weapons clause also goes to 
intent and knowledge and he's a convicted felon and it's— 
it's reinforced in his probation agreement that he's not to 
have any weapons and if he has weapons, this goes to his 
knowledge, which is my burden to prove and I believe it's 
relevant. 
THE COURT: Well, let me think about that for a 
second. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Now, and I—I'm not asking for all 
the other conditions, but I will refer to a probation 
agreement like a proffer through the A P & P agent, that he 
was aware that he was not to have weapons, two-fold, 
because he's a convicted felon and because they reiterated 
it on his probation agreement. 
THE COURT: Yes. I—I'm going to allow you to do 
that because there is—there is a mental state that's 
required for this crime and I think that that may well be 
relevant to the jury establishing that mental state. 
If you do—I don't think that the whole agreement 
needs to come in— 
MR. ESQUEDA: I don't think so, either. 
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THE COURT: —but you can make reference—you can 
make reference to that provision. 
And I'm going to tell the jury, if that comes in, 
that they're not to consider—they're not to convict Mr. 
Kirkwood based upon a violation of the probation agreement, 
that that's not what this is about. That we're going to 
give them the elements of the crime at the end of the trial 
and they can only convict Mr. Kirkwood if they find each of 
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 
MR. SIMMS: That's fine. 
THE COURT: All right. 
We'll be in recess until 10:30. I'm going to ask 
you to be in the courtroom at that time 'cause we'll just 
bring the jury in without trying to round people up first. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, Judge. 
(Recess.) 
THE COURT: We're back on the record in the 
matter of State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood, Case No. 
001915175. 
Mr. Kirkwood is present. He's represented by 
Clayton Simms. Mr. Esqueda's just outside the door— 
MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, I--
THE COURT: —and he is now present. 
MR. ESQUEDA: I asked my witnesses to come in and 
hear this—what we're about to argue, so that they'll fully 
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understand that they need to not open the door when they're 
testifying. 
THE COURT: All right. We've had a discussion 
off the record in chambers about whether or not the State 
can offer evidence of the reason for the search that 
resulted in the location of the weapons with which Mr. 
Kirk—the alleged weapons that Mr. Kirkwood is charged with 
possessing. 
The State wanted to put in evidence that A P & P 
had received information that Mr. Kirkwood was in 
possession of a firearm and that was what prompted the 
search. Mr. Simms has objected to that proposed testimony 
and that was discussed in my chambers outside the jury's 
presence. 
I have made the ruling that I do not want the 
State to offer evidence that the reason for the search was 
the suspicion that Mr. Kirkwood possessed a weapon. It was 
my concern in that regard that that would be 40(2)(b) 
material that might be damaging to Mr. Kirkwood's character 
in the eyes of the jury and make them more likely to 
convict him of the weapons charge in this case simply 
because of that—that tip. And I don't want that to 
happen• 
I have told Mr. Simms that he needs to be very 
careful that he not open the door to that information 
17 
coming in, notwithstanding my ruling; and as far as I'm 
concerned, any suggestion by Mr, Kirkwood or any witness 
by—or Mr. Simms or any of the witnesses for the defense 
that Mr. Kirkwood was simply being harassed by A P & P or 
that the search was not justified, that there weren't 
reasonable grounds for the search or any suggestion to that 
extent, in my mind would open the door and allow the State 
to prove the reasons for the search. 
Anything that you would like—would you like to 
supplement the record to any degree on that, Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: That was our understanding, Judge; 
or at least that was my understanding. 
MR. SIMMS: That is my understanding. 
THE COURT: Let's go ahead and bring in the jury. 
We're bringing in the jury and we'll ask the 
witnesses once again to return to the hall. 
We are back in—on the record in the matter of 
State of Utah vs. Kent Karl Kirkwood. Mr. Kirkwood is 
present, both counsel are present—present, and the jury is 
present. 
Mr. Esqueda, your opening statement, please. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, your Honor. If it 
please the Court, Mr. Simms, Mr. Kirkwood. 
If I may move this around, Judge? 
THE COURT: Sure. 
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MR. ESQUEDA: May I have free access to your 
courtroom as well? I tend to rove. 
I looked at your faces when your names were 
called and every jury I—I have, do the same thing. We 
understand that feeling, but we—we both appreciate your 
being here, taking your time out of your busy lives, your 
work, your families, your friends, because it's part of our 
system and without you, our system just does not work. So, 
I understand that—that desperation. 
And an example is that I'm going to give you is, 
I have a very good friend who was called to serve as a 
juror like you. She has two small children and her husband 
was working out of town. And the jury that was sat—I 
don't even know what the case was, it was not mine. And 
she calls me and says, Carlos, is there anything that you 
can do to get me out of jury duty? 
And I said to her, I said, Jody, no, if I'm 
called to jury duty, I have to show up and I have to 
breathe a sigh of relief if I'm not called and I have to 
moan and groan if I am called. We appreciate your help 
today. 
This case is not that difficult of a case and— 
and in respect to other cases that we handle here and the 
overall theme of these case is, everyone has to play by 
certain rules. And the problem here is, and the facts will 
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show that the defendant, Mr. Kirkwood, cannot play by those 
rules. 
As the Judge has already told you, Mr. Kirkwood 
is a convicted felon and that being the case, he didn't 
play by the rules. Then there are special rules that are 
imposed on a convicted felon and that is, you give up 
certain rights. One of those rights is to have weapons, 
whether to protect yourself or not, you are not allowed to 
have weapons. Knives included. 
Playing by the rules. He has special rules that 
he must follow and why we're here today is to show you that 
he didn't follow those rules. 
Now, on August 30th of last year, 2000, his 
A P & P agent, Roberta Hansen, who you met earlier today, 
along with another agent—or officer, excuse me Jeremy 
Poor, went to his home to conduct a routine search. That's 
part of his probation, that's part of being a convicted 
felon and they're there to see if he is in possession or 
have in custody or his control any weapons. 
They get there, they see that he's in a truck and 
his mother's present as well. They approach, he gets out 
of the truck. And as the facts will show, it's Officer 
Poor who approaches the defendant first and they do a pat-
down search, for their own safety and the safety of the 
defendant, to see if he has any weapons on him. And again, 
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that's because of his status as a restricted person; if 
you're a convicted felon, you're restricted from being able 
to possess these weapons. 
They asked Mr, Kirkwood, the defendant, and his 
mother if they can search the home. And that's routine. 
That's what happens to you if you're a convicted felon, 
people can come into your home and search for weapons. 
They both consent. Even though they don't need consent to 
search the house, they can go in without a warrant, that's 
part of the restrictions about being a convicted felon. 
So, as a result, they enter the home and they 
search the home. They go into the defendant's bedroom and 
in the defendant's bedroom, Officer Hansen first notices a 
knife, about a four-inch blade with a bone handle, sitting 
on a table next to his bed. 
Well, that causes her concern and she immediately 
takes possession of that weapon. And she knows that the 
defendant is a convicted felon, that he was convicted of 
robbery and that he's not allowed to have custody, control 
or possession of a dangerous weapon, a knife. So, she 
takes that and notifies him. He later admits that he knows 
he's not supposed to have any weapons. 
Shortly thereafter Officer Poor, he sees a canvas 
on the floor. He opens the canvas bag and yet again, there 
is another weapon, it's a folding knife with a serrated 
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blade. He immediately takes Mr. Kirkwood into custody, he 
arrests him there and they charge him with possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person because he is a 
convicted felon, he cannot have those weapons. 
That's why we're here today. That's why we chose 
you to sit as our jurors. Now, it's my job as a prosecutor 
to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that that's in 
fact what happened. That he's a restricted person and that 
he had in possession or custody and control over two 
weapons, each weapon is an offense in itself. That's two 
charges. 
And it's based upon the fact that he can't have 
those, he has to play by special rules. You and I can have 
those items because we don't have to deal with those 
special rules. But as a part—opportunity to continue in 
this community, that's one of the conditions that he has to 
abide by and the facts will show that, yet again, he 
couldn't abide by those rules. 
The legal principles of burden of proof, 
reasonable doubt and the presumption of innocence are 
cornerstone principles of our American justice system. The 
Judge started to give you a great history lesson about it. 
I was more interested in that than in selecting you, it was 
very interesting, about that person, trial by ordeal, who 
had to put the—the hot iron in his hand and walk nine 
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paces and if he didn't get burned, he was, what, innocent; 
right? 
Well, you put something hot, like a hot burning 
iron in your hand, you're going to get burned. That's not 
what our justice system is all about. So, they're placing 
upon the prosecution to prove an individual guilcy beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
And I believe in that system. The problem here 
is that there is going to be no doubt and remember that any 
doubt that you have doesn't justify it, it has to be 
reasonable, would a reasonable person have a doubt? It's a 
doubt in your mind that is reasonable. 
But when you hear the facts how the agents went 
in, justifiably so, found these two knives, placed the 
defendant in custody and that's why we're here and when you 
hear that evidence, your only conclusion and I'm asking you 
to do it, is to find the defendant guilty of possessing a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. Two counts. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: Thank you, Judge, Counsel. 
I would like to thank you for serving here today 
and I know Mr. Kirkwood would as well. Unlike Mr. Esqueda, 
I think it's exciting to be on a jury, I think this is what 
the Constitution is all about. I think that your service 
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here today is sort of the lifeblood of our system. Rather 
than being sort of down, I'd be up about it. I'm really 
actually very envious, I've always wanted to be on a jury, 
but I don't think that I would be selected. 
The prosecution has set up a theme and they said 
that he has special rules and I—I think that's true, he is 
a felon. And who told you that? We stipulated to that. 
We're not trying to hide that, today. They don't have to 
prove that, we have given that up. 
We—we—he knows who he is, he knows what he's 
done in the past, he knows he's been—he's been—he pled 
guilty to robbery and part of who he is, is he's on 
probation now and he—and—and A P & P is free to go check 
his place at any time. And in fact, what you're going to 
hear today is someone who was in his truck, about to back 
up and A P & P arrived. 
Mr. Poor—the gentleman who is outside the 
courtroom right now, you don't see him, he's going to come 
in—searched Kirkwood, searched his person, no weapons. 
Sure, come on in the house, let's—let's—let's see what's 
there. They looked at all the—it's my understanding they 
looked at all the rooms in the house, but first, what they 
did is, they went into Mr. Kirkwood's room. 
He said, sure, here's my room. Here—here's the 
room that I use. You're going to see that there's a wash 
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room, that there's a closet, that there's a bed and there's 
a door with access to the—to the back of the house. 
So, what did he do? He said, sure, this is ray 
room. This is—the same thing, I have nothing to hide and 
the officer, the A P & P officials, they saw a knife on the 
table. I eat with a knife, I'm not a savage. What am I 
going to do, eat—eat meat like, you know, with my hands or 
something? Of course, I have a knife in my room, I was 
eating in my room, using it to cut tape, using it as a 
tool. They found that knife. You're going to see it, it's 
probably bigger than a standard knife and you'll see it, it 
has like a little wooden, sort of a bone-type handle. A 
little bit rusty; but you're going to hear from Mr. 
Kirkwood, he's going to tell you what he was using that 
for. 
And you're also going to hear that in, I think— 
I believe in a closet, they found this red bag and they 
searched through the bag and they found a knife. A lot of 
people are using that closet in the house. Mr. Kirkwood, 
it's—it's not a room that's sort of exclusively his. 
Other people have access to that. 
You'll see in pictures of the room or 
descriptions of the room, that there's a washer and dryer 
in there, that maybe other people have stuff in the closet, 
maybe it's a shared closet. He's going to say, that's not 
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my knife. 
And interestingly also, they found other tools 
that were there and I believe that there was a tool box 
there. So, that's what you're going to hear. And our 
stories are going to be in agreement, there's no—there's 
no debate. These knives were found, but are they dangerous 
weapons? No. 
Mr. Kirkwood is innocent and you'll find that 
out. This case is very similar to sort of buying eggs at 
the grocery store. You want to pop open that top and look 
and see if there's any cracks in any of those eggs and our 
position is today that there are a few cracks, when you 
really examine what's going on here, when you look at what 
Mr. Kirkwood did, are you going to find that he's innocent? 
I—I believe so. 
And it's interesting, the prosecutor talked about 
trial by ordeal. This—this is an ordeal for Mr. Kirkwood, 
it's not easy for him to come in here and—and face you, 
but he's willing to do that and we just hope that you'll 
hear our side of the story. 
THE COURT: All right. Your first witness? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Be Roberta Hansen, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Please step forward, face the clerk 
and be sworn. 
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ROBERTA HANSEN, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Good morning. 
THE WITNESS: Good morning. 
THE COURT: State your name, please. 
THE WITNESS: My name is Roberta Hansen. 
THE COURT: Spell your last name. 
THE WITNESS: H-a-n-s-e-n. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Esqueda. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, ESQUEDA; 
Q How are you employed, Officer Hansen? 
A I'm a probation-parole officer with Adult 
Probation & Parole, Utah Department of Corrections. 
Q How long have you been a probation-parole 
officer? 
A For ten years. 
Q Were you in that position on August 30th of last 
year, the year 2000? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q Now, as a probation officer, what are your 
duties? 
A Principally, our duties are to protect the 
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community. Secondary, we are to insure that our clients, 
probationers or parolees, are complyinq with the orders by 
the courts or the Board of Pardons, depending on their 
status• Secondary, we work in a treatment capacity, 
counseling capacity. 
Q Now, are you familiar with the defendant, Kent 
Karl Kirkwood? 
A I am. 
Q Do you see him in the courtroom today? 
A Yes. 
Q Could you point him out and describe what he's 
wearing today? 
A He's seated at the defense desk. He's wearing a 
blue blazer and a yellow and black tie. 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, we will stip to 
identification. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Members of the jury, the defense has stipulated 
that Officer Hansen has identified the defendant. You may 
accept that as true. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) And how do you know Mr. 
Kirkwood? 
A He was on probation assigned to my case load. 
Q And what was he on probation for? 
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A A conviction of robbery, a second-degree felony. 
Q Now, on August—I'm going to direct your 
attention to August 30th of last year. Did you go to Mr. 
Kirkwood's home? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q All right. And do you know where that is 
located? 
A It's 45 East Guest Avenue in South Salt Lake. 
Q Is that in Salt Lake County? 
A Yes. It is. 
Q Okay. And what was the purpose of you going to 
his address? 
A We were there to conduct a search of his 
residence. 
Q Okay. Is that part of your duties as a probation 
officer? 
A It is. 
Q Did you go with a warrant? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 
A A warrant's not required. It's a standard 
condition of probation that he allow a search of his 
residence any time day or night. 
Q Okay. When you arrived at the residence, what 
did you first see? 
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A We first saw Mrs, Kirkwood, who was standing by a 
gate in the front yard of the house. We spoke with her, 
told her why we were there and asked if we could search the 
house. 
Q And what did she respond? 
A She said that we had permission to do so. 
Q What was the next step that you took? 
A As we proceeded into the yard, Mr. Kirkwood 
stepped from a truck that was in the driveway. My partner 
then walked over to him. 
Q Did you notice him prior to that time? 
A I did not, no. 
Q Okay. And who—who went with you to Mr. 
Kirkwood's residence? 
A My partner, Officer Jeremy Poor. 
Q And he's an A P & P officer as well? 
A He is. 
Q And Mr.—you say Mr. Kirkwood stepped out of the 
truck and did what? 
A He and Mr. Poor spoke briefly. He allowed Mr. 
Poor to pat him down, for officer's safety reasons. 
Q And did you see that? 
A I did. 
Q Okay. Then—then what happened? What did you do 
next? 
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A Then we proceeded into the house. We walked 
through the living room, through Mrs. Kirkwood's bedroom 
and into Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom. 
Q Can you des—could you describe the access to Mr. 
Kirkwood's bedroom? 
A The access was either through Mrs. Kirkwood's 
bedroom or there was a door that led to the outside, near 
the—a garage or shed. 
Q How did you know this area was Mr. Kirkwood's? 
A He told us it was. 
Q Okay. And how did he describe it to you? 
A He said, This is my bedroom. 
Q Okay. What did you do when you first entered the 
bedroom? 
A I checked the bed area. It's a very small room, 
there wasn't much room to maneuver and it was very 
cluttered. I checked the bed to make sure there were no 
weapons or anything else that would be harmful to us, then 
asked Mr. Kirkwood to sit on the bed. 
Q Okay. Why were you looking for weapons? 
A For officer safety. 
Q Okay. Now, you being his probation officer, is— 
is the defendant allowed to have any weapons? 
A He is not. 
Q And why is that? 
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1 A Because he's a restricted person under Utah law 
2 and also under Federal law. 
3 Q So that's—that's based upon his conviction that 
4 you mentioned for the robbery charge? 
5 A It is. 
6 Q And you, at that point in time, you're looking 
7 around his bed? 
8 A Initially I patted down his bed to make sure 
9 there was nothing in it that would be harmful to us. 
10 Q Did you find anything? 
11 A I did not, in the bed, no. 
12 Q What was your next step? 
13 A I was glancing around the room. There was a 
14 table, as you face the bed, to the right of the bed and on 
15 that table was a large knife. 
16 Q Could you describe it? 
17 A It has a blade around four inches, curving on the 
18 end and the handle is either wood or bone. 
19 Q Where did you find this? 
20 A It was on a table next to Mr. Kirkwood's bed. 
21 Q What did you do with the weapon? 
22 I A I seized it. 
23 Q Did you ask him any questions about that knife at 
24 that time? 
25 A I did. I told him he knew that he was not 
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supposed to have it, asked what it was doing there. 
Q So, he admitted to you that he knew he wasn't 
supposed to have a weapon? 
A He did. 
Q Okay. What was his response to your questioning? 
A He said he brought it into his room the night 
before when he was eating. 
Q Did he say he brought it in from where? 
A I don't believe he did. 
MR. ESQUEDA: May I approach? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, may I have leave to 
approach the witness during the trial? 
THE COURT: That would be fine. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you* 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) Roberta—Ms. Hansen, I'm 
handing you what's been marked as State's Exhibit No. 2. 
Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. That is the knife that was on the table in 
Mr. Kirkwood's room. 
Q And when you saw that knife, what was the first 
thing that you did? 
A I seized it. I took it by the handle and held 
it, for my protection, away from the offender and away from 
ray partner. 
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Q Where was Mr. Kirkwood when you recovered that 
knife? 
A He was sitting on the bed. 
Q And this—this table that you found this 
particular knife, what was it—what was the proximity to 
the bed itself? 
A It was right up against the bed. 
Q And this is the same area where Mr. Kirkwood had 
previously admitted that's his bedroom? 
A Yes. It is. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Move to admit State's No. 2, Judge. 
MR. SIMMS: No objection. 
THE COURT: All right* Exhibit 2 is received in 
evidence. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Your Honor, would—could I publish 
this to the jury? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Just a warning. Be very careful 
with that as you please pass that around. 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) After securing that weapon, 
what did you do next, Ms. Hansen? 
A I spoke with Mr* Kirkwood* I reminded him that 
he had been told when he signed his probation agreement 
that kitchen knives belong in the kitchen and if they were 
anywhere else, they would be considered a weapon. He 
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indicated he knew that and understood it. 
Q Did he indicate to you that that was just a 
kitchen knife? 
A He did. 
Q Was there anyone else in the room when you 
discovered that knife? 
A Officer Poor was. 
Q Okay. And the defendant? 
A And the defendant. And Mrs. Kirkwood. 
Q Anyone else? 
A NO. 
Q What did you do after that? 
A We continued to search the room, keeping Mr. 
Kirkwood on the bed. We searched the cupboards under the 
bed, the washer and dryer, the closet, the things that were 
cluttered around the room. 
Q Now, can you describe this room to the jury? You 
mentioned it was small, but what other items or—well, why 
don't you just give a description of what you observed in 
that—that room? 
A All right. Standing in the doorway of the room, 
you immediately face the bed. It is a twin bed. 
Immediately to the left is a washer and dryer combination. 
The distance between the washer and the dryer and the bed 
is a matter of only a couple of feet. 
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To the right, as you face the bed, there was a 
table. There were a number of items, bags, clothing and 
other things on the floor. There are two closets in the 
room on the far right wall, both of them were—are small 
closets with door that open out as opposed to sliding 
doors. 
Q Now, I'm approaching what's been marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit C; do you recognize that? 
A Yes. That's Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom. It wasn't 
that clean when I was there. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Move to admit Defendant's Exhibit 
C. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. SIMMS: No. It's our exhibit so we have no 
objection. 
MR. ESQUEDA: May I publish? 
THE COURT: C is received and yes, you may 
publish. 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) After you conducted your 
thorough search, did you uncover anything else? 
A Officer Poor did. 
Q Were you present when that was uncovered? 
A I was. 
Q And what was that? 
A There was a red gym bag on the floor and inside 
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of that bag, he found a folding knife. 
Q Could you describe that knife? 
A It's a—has about a three-inch blade that folds 
and locks into the handle. The handle has a black rubber 
grip. The blade is serrated, primarily on the end. 
Q Were—and did you actually see Officer Poor 
obtain that weapon? 
A I saw him take it out of the bag, yes. 
Q I'm handing you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit No. 1. Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. That's the knife from the red gym bag. 
Q And that's the one that Officer Poor pulled out 
of a red gym bag? 
A It is. 
Q Okay. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Move to admit State's No. 1. 
MR. SIMMS: No objection. 
THE COURT: Exhibit l's received. 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) You mentioned that the blade 
was serrated. Let's take a look at that—that blade. Is 
that—is that actually the blade that was— 
A It is. And you'll notice that it's serrated on 
the end there. 
Q Okay. 
MR. ESQUEDA: And your Honor, may I publish? 
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THE COURT: You may. 
MR. ESQUEDA: And it looks sharp, so be careful. 
Q (By Mr. Esqueda) After this second knife was 
located in the defendant's bedroom, what action did you and 
Officer Poor take? 
A We told Mr. Kirkwood he was under arrest. 
Officer Poor placed him in restraints and he was again 
seated on the bed. 
Q Did you have any further discussions about the 
second knife, the knife with the serrated blade— 
A Yes. 
Q —with Mr. Kirkwood? 
A Yes. 
Q What was that discussion? 
A Mr. Kirkwood stated that it was not his, he 
didn't know it was in the bag and we reminded him that it 
was in his bedroom, it was in his possession, it was under 
his control. 
Q Did he give you an indication of whose knife that 
was? 
A He did not. 
Q At that point in time, what did you do? 
A We continued to search the room. Officer Poor 
asked Mr. Kirkwood if we would find additional knives and 
he indicated he had a knife tool, it's a tool with a number 
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of blades in that and Mr.—Agent Poor found that and we 
also took that into custody. 
Q Was there anything else taken? 
A Yes. There was a second tool, they're commonly 
called Gerber tools, has a number of blades, knife blades, 
but it also has other tools as a part of the tool. 
Q Now, did you also look in any other rooms in the 
home? 
A We did. We went through Mrs. Kirkwood's room, 
with her permission, the bathroom, the living room, the 
kitchen, the outside was searched, including the garage or 
shed. 
Q Now, did you actually search the kitchen of the 
Kirkwood home for any other knives that were similar to 
this? 
A I did not. 
Q Did you look in the kitchen at all? 
A I went through the kitchen, I looked on 
countertops, I did not go through drawers or cupboards. 
Q In your cursory review of the kitchen, did you 
see any other similar knives— 
A I did not. 
Q —as State's No. 2? 
A Correct. 
Q How about in the kitchen with State's No. 1? 
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A No. 
Q Okay. 
MR, SIMMS: Was that no—no, you didn't see any 
or no, you didn't search? I'm sorry. 
THE WITNESS: No. I did not see any knives 
similar to Exhibit No. 1. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Nothing further, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: Thank you, Judge. 
CRQSS-EXAMINATIQN 
BY MR, SIMMS; 
Q So, when Mr.—when you found the first knife 
which is right here, the bigger of the two— 
A Yes. 
Q —Mr. Kirkwood said, I was eating? 
A He said he took it into his room when he was 
eating. 
Q Okay. Can felons use knives when they eat? 
A Certainly. 
Q Or—they can? 
A When they're eating. 
Q Okay. So, it's not a crime to, say, go out to 
have a steak dinner and eat with a knife— 
A Of course not. 
Q —if you're a felon? Okay. 
40 
And then when the other knife was found, he 
immediately said, hey, that's not my bag, that's not my 
knife? 
A Yes. 
Q So, let me just go over some—all the events that 
took place on that day. So, you're there on August 30th— 
A Uh huh. 
Q —and you run into Mr. Kirkwood; right? 
A Uh huh. 
Q But you first run into his—his mom; is that 
correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. And is it this woman you see in the gray 
suit on the front row? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So, that's Kitty Kirkwood? 
A Yes. 
Q The defendant's mother? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And she said, sure, you can look through 
the home? 
A She gave us permission, yes. 
Q Okay. And then you saw Mr. Kirkwood and he was 
patted down by Mr. Poor, who discovered nothing on his body 
that you could see; right? 
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A That's correct. 
Q And then you—everybody went in the house? 
A That's correct. 
Q Okay. Is it a big house or a—a smaller house? 
A It's fairly small. 
Q Okay. 
MR. SIMMS: If I may approach the witness, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Simms) I'm handing you Defendant's 
Exhibit B. Is that a—does that look like the same room 
that you referred to earlier? 
A Yes. It does. 
Q Okay. It's a little bit cleaner in that picture; 
right? 
A Substantially. 
Q Do—do you see a washer and dryer in that 
picture? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And did you ever ask Mr. Kirkwood if—if 
people shared the closet with him? 
A I didn't ask him, no. 
Q Okay. You—you see that doorf there's a door in 
that picture; correct? 
A Yes. 
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Q And where does that door lead to? 
A Outside. 
Q Okay. Is that the only sort of back entrance and 
sort of in and out? 
A Back entrance to the home? 
Q Yes. 
A As far as I know, yes. 
Q Okay. So, there's only one entrance—one exit 
out of the back? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. So you'd have to walk through his room to 
get through the back, if you want to enter outside the 
house? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. 
MR. SIMMS: And if I may approach again. 
Q (By Mr. Simms) If I can just hand you what's— 
it's marked Defendant's Exhibit E, but do you—do you 
recognize that? 
A It is similar to the knife-tool combination that 
we seized from Mr. Kirkwood. 
Q Okay. So, what was— 
A This—I did not retain a chain of custody on 
this, so I cannot say that it is the precise tool. 
Q Okay. But it looks very similar to you? 
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A It does. 
Q Now, does that have blades? Could you open up 
maybe a blade on that? 
A It could take me a minute. There's one. 
Q Just maybe just what about one blade. 
A There's one right there. 
Q Sure. All right. And that's sort of a—you 
described that as a tool? 
A When Mr. Poor asked him if there were other 
knives, he described this one, saying where it was located, 
saying that he had it. 
Q Saying he had something--
A This is—this is the third item we found in the 
house. Mr. Kirkwood responded to a question of, is there 
other knives by describing this tool. 
Q Okay. 
MR. SIMMS: If I can have continuing permission 
to approach— 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. SIMMS: —the witness. 
Q (By Mr. Simms) I'm handing you Defendant's 
Exhibit F. Does that look very similar to another item 
that you got from the home? 
A It does. 
Q Okay. Is it the same? 
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A The—the same as the tool we found? 
Q Yes. 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And does that have a blade on it? 
A It has numerous blades on it. 
Q Okay. Could you just maybe pull one blade out? 
A There's a small one. 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, at this time, we would 
move for admission of Defendant's E and F. 
MR. ESQUEDA: No objection. 
THE COURT: Received. 
MR. SIMMS: And if I may publish that to the 
jury, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Do you want to move for admission of 
Exhibit B? 
MR. SIMMS: Yes, we would move for that as well, 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. ESQUEDA: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It may be received as well. 
MR. SIMMS: And may I publish B, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. SIMMS: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Simms) Now, would you agree or disagree, 
when you—when someone talks about a common understanding 
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of words, when someone talks about a tool, would you agree 
or disagree that the following is—is defined as a tool? 
Any implement, instrument, utensil held in the hand and 
used for cutting, hitting, digging, rubbing, et cetera, 
knives, saws, hammers, shovels; would you agree or disagree 
that that is the definition of tool? 
A It could be a definition of a tool, yes. 
Q Okay. Now, do you have people who were on 
probation, convicted felons and who work at say, machine 
shops? 
A Certainly. 
Q Okay. And do they come in contact with maybe 
things that cut tape or cut rope? 
A Yes. 
Q And is that a—a violation? 
A It is not, as long as the tool is used 
specifically as a part of their work and that it is stored 
with other similar tools. 
Q So, it's sort of based on use? 
A It is. 
Q Okay. And I—and I suppose that Mr. Kirkwood 
could play baseball; right? 
A Of course. 
Q With—with a bat; but if he used that bat maybe 
to sort of hit somebody, then that would be a weapon? 
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A It is specifically discussed with him when he 
signs his probation agreement that a baseball bat stored 
with recreational equipment and used in that context is a 
baseball bat. 
Q Okay. So, it's based on the use? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. And you—when you saw that knife on the 
table, did he ever make a move for it or try to stab 
anybody? 
A No. He did not. 
Q Okay. So, he never reached for any of the 
knives? 
A He did not. 
Q Okay. And you said that you looked through the 
kitchen, but you didn't look through the drawers to see 
similar-type knives? 
A I said I did not. 
Q Okay. You did not. Do you know if Officer Poor 
did? 
A No* The South Salt Lake officers searched the 
kitchen. 
Q Okay. But a knife in the kitchen wouldn't be a— 
wouldn't be a problem, would it? 
A No. 
MR. SIMMS: No further questions. 
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THE COURT: Any redirect? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Just briefly. 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ESQUEDA! 
Q The last two items, Defense Exhibits—Defense 
Exhibits F—E and F, you didn't draw any concerns from 
these items? 
A I had concerns about them, yes; ordinarily, we 
don't allow probationers to carry so much as a pocket knife 
on their person. 
Q But you distinguished these items as tools? 
A I did-
Q As compared to these two items as knives; is that 
right? 
A That's correct. 
MR. ESQUEDA: If we could approach, Judge? 
THE COURT: You may. 
(Whereupon, an inaudible off-the-record 
discussion was held at side bar.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'm going to 
excuse you about five minutes. We have a legal issue 
that's come up, Counsel wants my attention at maybe more 
length than it makes sense to whisper here at the bench; so 
while we're on this break, please don't discuss the case, 
don't form or express any opinion about the case. Don't 
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allow anyone to discuss the case in your presence and be 
ready to come back because hopefully, this will just be a 
minute. 
Please rise as we excuse the jury. 
Okay. I—I think I understand Mr. Esqueda's 
argument. Ordinarily, the nature of the underlying offense 
and what was used to commit the underlying offense would be 
of no concern in this trial; but the distinction that 
you've tried to make here is between these knives—between 
knives as weapons and knives as tools. 
And it strikes me that Mr. Esqueda has a good 
argument that—with respect to Mr. Kirkwood, that he 
intended to possess a knife as a weapon because of his use 
of a knife in his prior felony. 
Let me hear what your response to that is. 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor# if you look at Page 3 of 
State v. TuckerP what I've handed you, it states: A 
prosecutor may not parade the details of a prior crime in 
front of the jury. The defendant is subject to cross-
examination only to test his veracity and credibility and 
collateral matters should not be taken in; but this case 
stands for the proposition that if the defendant opens the 
door to something like that, sure, it could become—it 
could come in. But I don't think that another witness 
could open the door on that. 
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And anyways, I think it's—it's very prejudicial. 
I think it's—it's—even if the Court views it as relevant, 
I think under 403, it's highly prejudicial, more 
prejudicial than probative and I think this case has 
already taken a direct—a turn in the wrong way and that 
we're—we're really arguing over the probation violation 
rather than arguing is he a felon? Yes. And then, Does he 
have a weapon? 
And—and we're sort of blending in the two, is it 
a probation violation? Is it a new offense? 
THE COURT: Well, what the statute says with 
respect to whether something is a weapon is: Dangerous 
weapon means any item that in the manner of its use or 
intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury. The following factors shall be used in determining 
whether a knife or other item, object or thing not commonly 
known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous weapon. 
And those are, the character of the instrument, 
object or thing; the character of the wound produced, if 
any; the manner in which the instrument, object or thing 
was used and the other lawful purposes for which the 
instrument, object or thing might be used. 
Now, what you're contending, what you've opened 
the door to, I mean, the—the issues that you're making is 
that this—this—these knives were not intended to be used 
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as a weapon, their—their use was for eating or in one 
case, wasn't even his knife. 
Why—you know, and making this a big thing about 
the distinction between—or the fact that a knife can also 
be a tool, why doesn't that open the door for Mr. Esqueda 
to say, he in—you know, he—there were—the jury may find 
that he intended to use them as a knife because in the 
past, he has used a knife to commit crimes. His use of a 
knife as a weapon in the past. 
MR. SIMMS: Well, your Honor— 
THE COURT: He's not a stranger to the idea that 
maybe you can cut steak with this, but you can also use it 
as a weapon. 
MR. SIMMS: Well, I think that obviously anyone 
can use a weapon—I mean a knife as a weapon. I think that 
we need to inform the jury that there was four items taken, 
I don't want them speculating on—on the other items as 
being, you know, some type of other type of knife. And 
actually, in the police report, they refer to it as tool 
and I want to make the distinction between what is being 
argued here as being sort of the issue of the knives and 
these two other items aren't—aren't included in that. 
Again, it's in the police report that these are tools. I 
believe that they even said that they found them in a—in a 
tool box. 
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I—I think that if—I mean, they already know 
that he was convicted of a robbery• They already know a 
certain amount of—of Mr. Kirkwood's past. I think that 
the—that it's easy to gain a conviction if we just bring 
in everything about Mr. Kirkwood up and— 
THE COURT: Well, that's not what we're about. 
MR. SIMMS: Well— 
THE COURT: What we're about is trying to—I 
mean, what—what this requires us to do is really look into 
Mr. Kirkwood's mind and determine whether he intended to 
possess this knife as a weapon or for some other purpose. 
But that's really what it comes down to. 
MR. ESQUEDA: And that's what he brought up in 
the issue. I didn't bring up the other tools. He's the 
one who made the definition of the tool and is—is putting 
all the exhibits, including my exhibits, the two knives, as 
this—part of his broad definition of a tool. 
And now, I have evidence to show that that's not 
the case here. And I'd like to bring that forward, and he 
opened the door to it. 
THE COURT: This is a really close one, in my 
judgment. 
MR. ESQUEDA: I mean, I think the Court hit the 
nail on the head when you said, you know, I can bring forth 
evidence which shows that he intended to possess these two 
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items as knives, not as tools. And I didn't bring that up, 
but Mr. Simms did. 
THE COURT: I guess the concern that—let me have 
you address this, Mr. Esqueda. 
The concern that is developing in my mind is that 
it's mildly probative of his intent, that in his first 
crime he used a knife and so therefore, he used a knife as 
a weapon in the past and that sheds some light on what his 
intent is now; but it's real prejudicial. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, I think it's more probative 
in the fact, especially since Mr. Simms brought up these 
tools, as to why we have a distinction here between two— 
two items that are obviously tools and two items that are 
not. And that goes directly to his intent. Directly, 
Judge. It's more probative than it is prejudicial. Hell, 
my whole case is prejudicial against the defendant, but I'm 
allowed to bring in probative evidence and this is clearly 
more probative, since he opened the door. 
You know, I didn't open the door. If he opened 
this and it happens to be prejudicial to his client, that's 
his fault, that's not my fault. And now I'm entitled to 
walk through that door. 
THE COURT: Well, let's—let's just break that 
down a little bit. The fact that he's mak—how does it 
open the door, the fact that he's trying to distinguish 
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between tools and knives—tools and weapons, how does that 
open the door to— 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, I— 
THE COURT: It does, though, it just does. 
Because it really comes down to what is his intent in 
possessing these items. 
MR. ESQUEDA: That's my point, Judge. 
MR. SIMMS: Your—your—even if you get past that 
hurdle, she has no personal information as to what happened 
with his robbery* Everything is based on sort of hearsay 
or what she's heard or—or somehow gathered some 
information from a third party, or I don't even know where 
she gets this information that a knife was used in the 
robbery. So, I think— 
THE COURT: I think there is the problem with 
personal knowledge here. The fact that she has read the 
pre-sentence report doesn't give her personal knowledge. 
MR. ESQUEDA: I suppose we could voir dire right 
now and see if she had any discussions with the— 
THE COURT: Let's do that. Go ahead. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MRt ESQUEDA; 
Q Have you had any discussions with Mr. Kirkwood 
about the underlying facts of his prior conviction for 
robbery? 
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A No. Only that it was a person and a violent 
offense and that he would be then on a higher level of 
probation supervision. 
Q Did he ever indicate to you that he had used a 
weapon in that—in those offenses? 
A He did not. 
Q How did you gain that information that a weapon 
was used? 
A From the pre-sentence report. 
Q Anyplace else? 
A No. 
THE COURT; I don't think that's good enough. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Okay, Judge. 
THE COURT: You may have—you may be able to get 
that some other way, but— 
All right. Let's bring the jury back. 
All right. We are back on the record with the 
jury present. I apologize for that delay. There was an 
important matter that's come up. I think that we've been 
able to make some progress on it while you were out and 
that will allow us to continue. 
Go ahead, Mr. Esgueda, 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, your Honor. 
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REDIRECT EXAMINATION fConfcjnnjni) 
BY MR, ESOUEDA; 
Q Now, in your search of the home, you found 
Stated No. 2 on this table; is that your testimony? 
A Yes. It is. 
Q Okay. Next to this knife that you discovered on 
the table, was there any plates or anything like that? 
A No. There wasn't. 
Q How about any food? Left-overs? 
A No. 
Q Crumbs? 
A I wouldn't know about crumbs. 
Q Okay. How about any remnants on the knife 
itself, that it had been used for food? 
A No. There was not. 
Q And the knife, the State's No. 1, the folding 
knife with the serrated blade, how about there? Did—was 
there any items of food around that item when it was 
discovered? 
A No. 
Q Did you check the knife to see if it had any food 
remnants on the blade itself? 
A I—I looked at the blade, I reviewed it. There 
was nothing on it. 
Q And in regards to State's 1 and 2, did the 
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defendant ever indicate that he used these as a particular 
tool? 
A Only to say that No. 2 was used to eat dinner the 
night before. 
Q But yet you didn't find any food items or plates 
in his room? 
A NO. 
Q Did the defendant ever indicate to you that he— 
at his employment, that he needed this—these types of 
items, referring to State's Exhibits 1—1 and 2? 
A No. Mr. Kirkwood was unemployed. 
Q Okay. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: All right. You—Ms. Hansen, you may 
step down. 
Yes, Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: I—I don't know if I have any 
recross. 
THE COURT: I hope you don't because I don't 
generally allow it unless there's some—something new that 
comes up on redirect. 
MR. SIMMS: No. 
THE COURT: You may—you may step down. 
THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. ESQUEDA: We'd call Officer Poor. 
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Step before the clerk and be sworn. 
JEREMY GREGORY POOR. 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State in this 
matter, after having been first duly sworn, assumed the 
witness stand and was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please state your name. 
THE WITNESS: My name is Jeremy Gregory Poor. 
THE COURT: And spell your last name, please? 
THE WITNESS: P-o-o-r. 
THE COURT: Go ahead, Mr. Esqueda. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, your Honor. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ESQUEDA: 
Q Officer Poor, how are you employed? 
A I'm employed by the Department of Corrections, 
Adult Probation & Parole. 
Q How long have you been a probation and parole 
officer? 
A Approximately eight months. 
Q What was your employment prior? Was it in 
corrections? 
A It was. I was a security enforcement sergeant at 
the Utah State Prison. 
Q And I take it from there as a sergeant at the 
prison, you went to A P & P? 
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A I did. 
Q And were you employed as a probation and parole 
officer on August 30th of the year 2000? 
A I was. 
Q Did you have an occasion to be with Officer 
Hansen on that date? 
A I was. 
Q And you know the defendant, do you not? 
A I do. 
Q Did you have an occasion to go to the defendant's 
residence on August 30th, 2000? 
A Yes, we did. 
Q Uh huh. Do you remember where that lo—that 
residence was located? 
A I have it in my report and I do remember— 
Q Where was that? 
A —the address. 
The address is 45 East Guest Avenue. 
Q Now, I noticed that you're looking at your 
report. Is that helping you refresh your recollection? 
A It is. 
Q Okay. And that's in Salt Lake County? 
A It is. 
Q And what was the purpose of going to defendant 
Kirkwood's residence? 
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A To assist Agent Hansen in a home visit. 
Q Is that part of a routine that probation officers 
typically engage in? 
A Yes, we do. 
Q And they typically engage that in (sic) with 
their probationers; is that right? 
A That is correct. 
Q And the fact that the—you knew that the 
defendant was—did you know that the defendant was a 
probationer of Ms. Hansen's? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Okay. Was he yours as well or were you just 
assisting? 
A I was just assisting Agent Hansen. 
Q And you're aware that the defendant was—is a 
convicted felon? 
A Yes. I was. 
Q When you arrived at the residence, what did you 
first do? 
A As we approached the front of the residence, I 
observed Mr. Kirkwood exiting a pickup truck that was 
parked in the driveway and I made contact with Mr. 
Kirkwood. 
Q What was the nature of that contact? 
A I just identified who I was as I approached him 
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as he was getting out of the vehicle. He wa wearing blue 
pants and they kind of started to drop and he grabbed his 
waist line. I asked him to keep his hands where I could 
see them. 
Q Where was Ms. Hansen at this time? Did you see 
her? 
A She was—we were approaching together. She was 
off to my—my right-hand side. 
Q So, when you approached the defendant, his pants 
were kind of falling down and he went to pull up his pants? 
A Uh huh. 
Q And you told him, Let me see your hands? 
A I did. 
Q What did you do next? 
A I asked Mr. Kirkwood to turn away from me and I 
conducted a search of his persons (sic). 
Q What was the purpose of the search? 
A Basically a search for my safety and Mr. 
Kirkwood#s. I checked him for—if he had any weapons on 
his person. 
Q Did you find any weapons on his person? 
A I did not. 
Q After you conducted—is that typically called a 
frisk? 
A Called a Terry frisk. 
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Q Okay. After this frisk, what did you do next? 
A Ms. Hansen explained to Mr. Kirkwood why we were 
there and we walked into the house. 
Q What was your purpose of going into the house? 
A To conduct a probation search. 
Q Where, in the house, did you go? 
A We went back to the rear of the residence where 
Mr. Kirkwood's residence—excuse me, where his bedroom is 
located. 
Q And do you recall how you gained access into Mr. 
Kirkwood's residence—or bedroom? Excuse me. 
A I—we followed Mr. Kirkwood, I followed Agent 
Hansen and Mr. Kirkwood's mother, I believe, also escorted 
us in there. 
Q Okay. And you ended up somewhere in the home? 
A In the bedroom. 
Q Okay. 
A It was Mr. Kirkwood's. 
Q How did you know it was Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom? 
A That's where Agent Hansen asked him to take us 
and—and they were talking about his probation at the time. 
0 Okay. Once you—how did you gain access into 
that bed—into Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom? 
A We followed him. 
Q Through— 
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A Oh. Okay. I'm sorry. 
Q Explain how the house is laid out. 
A Well, the front door is located in the front 
room. We walked through the front room, that you walk 
through the front room down into, I guess what would be the 
master bedroom, which is Ms.—the mother's bedroom. We 
walked through the mother's bedroom into Mr. Kirkwood's 
bedroom• 
Q Is there any other access into that bedroom? 
A There—later, we learned that there is a door 
that leads out to the back yard. 
Q Once you entered Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom, what did 
you do? 
A At first, we—or Agent Hansen just talked to him 
and then we conducted a search of his bedroom. 
Q And that search was a search to look for weapons? 
A It was. 
Q Where did—what was—what, specifically, did you 
do in regards to conducting this search? 
A Agent Hansen was talking to Mr. Kirkwood and she 
watched him while I started basically at one corner of the 
room and worked around, just searching various locations in 
his room. 
Q Okay. Why don't you describe the room to the 
jury? 
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A It's a small, rectangular room. It had one door, 
if you're standing in the doorway facing the room, it had a 
doorway to the left going out, outside. And then it had 
two doors on the right-hand side of the room which were 
both closets. There was also a washer and dryer and some 
cupboards on the room. 
Q Showing you what's been marked as Defense Exhibit 
B and C; do you recognize that? 
A Yes. That's the bedroom. 
Q Both— 
A Or Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom. 
Q Both of those photos? 
A They are. 
Q Now, when you began your search, did you—did you 
ever uncover any weapons at all, yourself? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q Okay. Describe to the jury what you did to 
uncover weapons. 
A While I was searching Mr. Kirkwood's bedroom, on 
his bedroom floor, there was a red gym bag and in the gym 
bag, there was a black and silver folding knife. 
Q Okay. I'm going to show you what's been marked 
as State's Exhibit No. 1; do you recognize that? 
A I do. 
Q And what is that? 
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A That's the black and silver knife that was 
located in the red gym bag. 
Q Now, it's a folding knife, is it not? 
A It is. 
Q Was it folded when you located it? 
A It was. 
Q Did you have a chance to open it at all? 
A At the time, I didn't. 
Q Okay. What did you do with that knife when you 
located it in—in the defendant's bedroom? 
A I notified Agent Hansen and I secured the weapon. 
Q How did you secure the weapon? 
A The weapon was in a folded—was folded and I just 
secured it on my person. And then a short time later, I 
handed it to Agent Hansen. 
Q How close was this—you described it as a red gym 
bag? 
A It was. 
Q How close was it to the defendant's bed? 
A The room is a pretty tight room, I mean, 
everything's, I mean, within reach. 
Q So, it's within reach of his bed? 
A It was within reach of his bed. 
Q Now, in the gym bag itself, did you find any 
identification? 
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A I did not. 
Q Okay. Was there anything else in the gym bag? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Okay. Just the knife? 
A Just the knife. 
Q Now, were there any other weapons that were 
uncovered during that search? 
A After the knife was found, I asked Mr. Kirkwood 
if he had any other knives in his room and he asked me if 
basically a Leatherman tool, a multi—a multi-purpose tool 
counted and he showed me where that was and I secured that. 
Q Were you aware if Ms. Hansen had discovered any 
other weapons? 
A After—after discovering the knife, I did learn 
that she had recovered a weapon. 
Q Do you know where she recovered that weapon? 
A I do not. 
Q I'm going to approach with what's been marked as 
State's No. 2. Do you recognize that? 
A Yes. I do. 
Q What is that? 
A That's the second knife that was recovered in Mr. 
Kirkwood's bedroom. 
Q Okay. Now, do you recall whether there was any 
food or plates in the bedroom? 
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A I don't recall. 
Q Okay. After you secured the knife that you 
found, State's No. 2, the folding knife— 
A Uh huh. 
Q —did you notify defendant Kirkwood of—of—of 
your discovery? 
A I did. And I had Mr. Kirkwood stand up and I 
placed him into custody. 
Q Did he make any statements in regards to that 
knife? 
Did he say it was his? 
A I—he said the gym bag belonged to a—to a 
friend. 
Q Did he indicate the name? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Now, when you conducted that search, was there 
anyone else in that room besides yourself, Ms. Hansen and 
the defendant? 
A I believe Ms. Kirkwood was in—in and out of the 
room. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: Yes. Thank you, Judge. 
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CFQSS-SXAMINATIQH 
BY MR. SIMMS; 
Q Now, you found this knife; was it in the closet 
in that gym bag? 
A No. It was not. 
Q Okay. But it's a small room; was it close to the 
closet? 
A It was in between the—the bed and I guess the 
closet, yes. 
Q Okay. And Mr. Kirkwood said it's not his bag? 
A Uh huh. 
Q And you found nothing else in there; correct? 
A In the bag? 
Q Yes. 
A No. 
Q Okay. So, there's nothing but: the knife, so 
there's no indication like a driver's license, some type of 
mail, some type of papers that would give an idea of whose 
bag that was? 
A In the bag? Not that I would recall. 
Q Okay. When you pulled that knife out of the bag, 
did Mr. Kirkwood ever say, That's not my knife? 
A At the time that I found the knife, I was—I 
don't remember—recall exactly what he stated. My concern 
was, at this time, since we found a weapon, for our safety, 
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to secure Mr. Kirkwood. 
Q Okay. And at some point, another—another knife 
was found, the one that's in front of you, the longer one 
with the—sort of the handle? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Did Mr. Kirkwood ever say that he was eating with 
that knife? 
A I remember, but not at which point, he did state 
it was a kitchen knife. 
Q Okay. Did he ever say that he was cutting a 
piece of tape with it? 
A Not that I recall. 
Q Okay. Did you also gather up some other items? 
A We did. 
MR. SIMMS: Approach, your Honor. 
Q (By Mr. Simms) Hand you Defendant's F and E, did 
you also—did you also recover those items? 
A Yes. 
Q And where were they? 
A The Leatherman was on the, I guess what he used 
as a night stand and the pocket knife was in a tool box. 
Q Okay. So, there was a tool box in the room? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. Was it—was it like—was there a washer 
and dryer in the room? 
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A Uh huh. 
Q Okay. And he said, This is my room? 
A Uh huh. 
Q Okay. 
MR. SIMMS: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Redirect? 
MR. ESQUEDA: None, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may step down. 
MR. ESQUEDA: At this point, the State rests, 
Judge. 
THE COURT: At this time, we're going to take our 
lunch break. Let's get back together again at 1:30. While 
we're on this break, don't form or express any opinion 
about the case, don't discuss the case with anyone or allow 
anyone to discuss the case in your presence. 
This is going to seem like a long noon hour, but 
we've got some things that we need to do with respect to 
jury instructions and other legal issues, so we'll be 
working while you're off and we'll see you back in the jury 
room at 1:30. 
Please stand while we excuse the jury. 
Be seated. 
There is one—I would like to express myself more 
fully on the evidentiary issue that came up with respect to 
whether or not Mr. Esqueda is entitled to put on evidence 
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of the prior crime involving a knife. 
First—the first question that I— I have to 
address is whether or not that's relevant to all of these 
proceedings and it seems to me that it is relevant, it's 
not overwhelmingly relevant. What—the—the issue that 
we're trying to decide in this case is whether or not Mr. 
Kirkwood's possession of a knife was intended to be 
possession of a weapon or possession of a tool. 
If you had a hundred people, hundred convicted 
felons that all had in their possession a knife, I think 
that the intent to possess that knife as a weapon would be 
somewhat greater for those felons who had used knives in 
prior crimes. And so for that reason, I find it to be 
relevant. 
The next issue is whether the relevance of that 
information is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial 
effect on this case. And it's not prejudicial just because 
it helps the State establish its case, it has to be 
unfairly prejudicial. 
Now, we've already admitted in this case that Mr. 
Kirkwood is a convicted felon. Nine-tenths of the 
prejudice that Mr. Kirkwood suffers as a result of this 
information coming in, he already suffers as the result of 
the fact that one of the elements in this case is his prior 
conviction of a felony and that's been admitted. 
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The additional prejudice that he res—that he 
experiences as a result of the jury learning that that 
prior conviction involved the use of a knife is only a 
slight increase in prejudice and really, it does go to 
establishing his intent with respect to the possession of 
these items. And I think it's made more relevant in this 
case and Mr. Esqueda has talked about opening the door. 
The relevance is—of that information is 
increased in this case in light of the defense's arguments 
that this is but one of a number of tools that Mr. Kirkwood 
possessed and he did not intend to possess it as a weapon. 
We dodged the bullet with respect to Ms. Hansen's 
testimony because I ruled that with respect to her 
testimony, she lacked sufficient persohal knowledge to make 
that—to testify, as far as the circumstances of the prior 
crime. 
That still may come up in other context and for 
that reason, Mr. Simms, I think that you want to think 
carefully about whether or not Mr. Kirkwood should testify 
because he obviously has information about—he has personal 
knowledge with respect to his prior crime. 
Do either of you want to say anything else— 
Yeah, please keep that cell phone off during the 
course off— 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I thought it was turned 
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off* I'm sorry. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, I—I think that's my claim. 
If we're talking about personal knowledge and the defendant 
takes the stand, I think I'm going to be entitled to ask 
him about the underlying facts of the robbery. 
THE COURT: Now, you—you brought to my 
attention, Mr. Simms, the case of State vs. Tucker. I have 
looked over that case. This case deals with what's 
appropriate under 609, which is impeachment, use of a prior 
crime for impeachment. We would not be, although Mr. 
Esqueda may well impeach Mr. Kirkwood by use of the prior 
crime, I would not allow discussion of the knife to come in 
for purposes of impeachment. I'm only allowing the knife 
to come in for whatever relevance and whatever light that 
it may shed on Mr. Kirkwood's intent with possessing these 
particular items. And—and—and in that way, this 
circumstance is distinguished from Tucker. 
MR. SIMMS: Okay. Your Honor, we simply weigh 
the balance of prejudice the heavier—sort of stronger than 
the Court and we understand the Court's position, but ours 
just differs and that's simply it. 
THE COURT: I understand that, Mr. Simms, but I 
wanted to make clear for the record the basis of my ruling. 
Do either of you have anything else that you'd 
like me to address before we break for lunch? 
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MR. SIMMS: I—I do have a directed verdict 
motion, your Honor, because— 
THE COURT: I'd be happy to hear it. 
MR. SIMMS: Okay. 
THE COURT: Just don't belabor it. 
MR. SIMMS: Well, I—I think that there hasn't 
been sufficient evidence to prove Count 1 or Count 2. 
Again, we would argue that the element of a dangerous 
weapon hasn't been made. We argue that it's a—simply a 
tool. 
THE COURT: Understood and overruled. 
Let's get back together at about 1:00 o'clock, 
would that be acceptable, to talk about jury instructions? 
MR. SIMMS: Yes. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Fine. 
THE COURT: Why don't you just come here to the 
courtroom and we'll bring you back to my chambers. 
We'll be in recess until then<, 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, Judge. 
(Recess•) 
THE COURT: Let's go on the record in the matter 
of the State of Utah versus Kirkwood. Mr. Kirkwood's 
present, both counsel are present, we're outside the 
presence of the jury. 
Now would be the time, Counsel, to make any 
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record you'd like to make with respect to the jury 
instructions. 
Mr. Simms? 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, I would object that the 
two jury instructions relating to the right to bear arms 
have not been included and that's the only exception we 
take to the jury instructions. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: The State has none, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Let's see if we have a 
jury ready. 
THE BAILIFF: Please rise for the jury. 
Please be seated. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that the jury 
is now present. 
Mr. Simms, this would be your chance to call any 
witnesses you choose to call? 
MR. SIMMS: Your Honor, we choose not to call any 
witnesses. We would rest. 
THE COURT: Very well. Then we'll proceed to 
jury instructions in this case. 
Members of the jury, this is probably not going 
to be your favorite part of the trial, because I'm now 
going to instruct you in the law which governs your 
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deliberations. And what that involves is my reading to you 
a number of rather involved statements of the law that are 
in language that is sometimes difficult to follow. Don't 
try and write down everything I'm going to tell you because 
I#m going to provide you with this copy of the jury 
instructions that you can take with you into the jury 
deliberation room. It's probably better to—to just try 
and focus on what's being said and—and get the general 
sense of the instructions and then if you have questions 
during the course of your deliberations, you can refer to 
the instructions themselves. 
(Whereupon, the jury instructions were read to 
the jury but not transcribed.) 
THE COURT: Mr. Esqueda, your closing argument? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, your Honor. 
If you really believe that these aren't dangerous 
weapons, then you need to acquit this man; but simply 
because you walked through the courthouse doors doesn't 
mean you lose all your common sense. Okay? Take a look at 
these weapons. These are dangerous weapons. It's obvious. 
There's an allegation that this is a kitchen 
knife. It's a pretty unique kitchen knife. Hold this, 
feel it, take a look at its condition. Is this really a 
kitchen knife? 
How about this one? A folding blade, serrated 
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edge. Is this a tool? This isn't merely a tool and I 
don't want you walJc out of here thinking, I can't use ray 
common sense, we're in a court of law. No, that's wrong. 
You have to rely on what you bring in here, and you bring 
here, you bring your common sense. These are dangerous 
weapons. 
The other aspect of this case is whether the 
defendant can have possession or have custody or control 
over these items. 
Judge, if I may, could I pull out that— 
THE COURT: You're welcome to. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Judge, I realize you*re not going 
to be able to see that. Is that going to cause you— 
THE COURT: No, that's fine. I understand. 
MR. ESQUEDA: I have to prove, as the prosecutor, 
these elements. 
Can you all see that? 
And this is an instruction that the Judge 
actually read to you. 
Before you can convict the defendant, Kent Karl 
Kirkwood of the offense of possession of a dangerous weapon 
as charged in Count 1 of the Information, you must find 
from all of the elements and beyond a reasonable doubt, 
each and every one of the following elements: 
That on or about the 30th day of August, 2000. 
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That's what we've been talking about, Ms* Hansen talked 
about the date. Mr. Poor, he talked about that date. 
In Salt Lake County. We've described the 
residence and its location within Salt Lake County. We've 
met that burden so far. 
Was it in the State of Utah? Obviously. 
The defendant, Kent Karl Kirkwood, possessed or 
had under his custody or control a weapon. Did he? Is 
that the real question? Well, what is custody or control? 
What is possession? 
The Judge read you an additional instruction. 
Can you see that? 
You're instructed that possession means a joint 
or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, 
retaining or belonging or maintaining. For a person to be 
a possessor of a dangerous weapon, it is not required that 
a person be shown to have individually possessed. Okay? 
What does that mean? Let's stop right there. 
When Jeremy Poor, the officer here, he first 
approached the defendant on the outside, he did a pat-down 
search. We all agree there was no weapon on the defendant 
at that time. This instruction says it doesn't have to be 
on his person. These weapons didn't have to be in his 
pocket. Okay? They didn't have to be here and when they 
patted him down, Oh, that's where it is. No. That's not 
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the law. 
What it says is, the dangerous weapon, but it is-
-but it's sufficient that it's shown that he joined or 
participated with one or more persons in the possession or 
control of a dangerous weapon, with the knowledge that that 
activity was occurring. 
Actual physical possession is not necessary to 
convict the defendant of possession of a dangerous weapon. 
Conviction may be based—may also be based upon 
construction possession. Construction possession exists 
where the dangerous weapon is subject to the defendant's 
dominion and control. 
All the evidence shows where the evidence—where 
the weapons were found. Do we have the pictures? 
THE COURT: Right here. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you, Judge. 
This is his bedroom. These are defense exhibits, 
they call it his bedroom, this is where he sleeps; in fact, 
he even admits, the State's No. 2, Oh, yeah, I was using 
that to eat. But according to Ms. Hansen here, there were 
no plates, there were (sic) no food, she couldn't tell if 
there were any crumbs, she didn't look that closely for 
crumbs; but what she did find was this weapon. This is a 
dangerous weapon. 
This weapon is commonly referred to as a pig 
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sticker on the street. This is not a steak knife. You 
don't cut meat with this, it's a weapon that you use 
against another individual. It is not a tool. 
To find that the defendant had constructive 
possession of a dangerous weapon, it is—it is necessary to 
prove that there is sufficient nexus or connection between 
the accused and the dangerous weapon to commit an inference 
that the accused had both the power and intent to exercise 
the dominion and control. 
Again, it's back in the bedroom. He admits to 
State's 2. Oh, yeah, I knew I had that but that's just a 
kitchen knife. Common sense. Is it a kitchen knife? 
What he doesn't admit to is No. 1. Oh, a friend 
of mine, that's his bag. Officer Poor, he says he found 
this knife in this gym bag, the red gym bag. Where was it? 
In the defendant's bedroom. Where was it in the bedroom? 
Oh, I'd say within arm reach of the bed. 
But the defendant's own words, he says, well, I 
didn't know about it, he was my friend. Well, which 
friend? Does he state who? Did he see where he got it 
from? Is that reasonable? Again, common sense. 
Control and dominion. That's what this case is 
all about. It's not on his person but it's in his control. 
Do you know what this is like? It's like money in the 
bank. Do you have any money that's in your bank account 
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right now on you? No, you don't. I don't. But you may 
have a checkbook or a credit card and that checkbook has 
access to your account in the bank, but the fact that it's 
not on your person, does that mean that that money in the 
bank is not yours? No. It is yours. And no one can take 
that way from you. Same thing applies to these dangerous 
weapons. They're the defendant's, it's in his bedroom. 
Okay. 
That such weapon was a dangerous weapon. We've 
been all through that. The other thing that there was a 
stipulation on that we had to show that he is a restricted 
person, that he is a convicted felon and he's never denied 
it. The stipulation shows that he agrees he was convicted 
of robbery. That makes him a convicted felon and that 
logically follows that he cannot possess, whether actual 
possession or through exercising dominion or control, over 
these weapons. 
Because remember what I told you in opening 
statement? I said, this is about playing by the rules. We 
all have to play by the rules—I shouldn't wave these 
around, it's kind of scary. 
We all have to play by the rules. You do. I do. 
Including the defendant, but you know what, the defendant 
had more rules to abide by than you and me. His rights are 
restricted by the nature of his conviction and he can't 
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have these in his bedroom, he can't have them in his car, 
he can't have them on his person because if he does, he's 
committed a new offense. And that's possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. When you're a 
convicted felon, you can't do that. 
But yet again, that shows he can't follow the 
rules, he couldn't follow the rules the first time 'cause 
he is a convicted felon, and then they placed more rules on 
them to try to curb his behavior and what happens? He 
still can't do it. That's what this case is all about, 
playing by the rules. 
If I have to do it, if you have to do is, so does 
he. And he has more of an obligation to show us that he 
can't do these actions, he can't perform what we can and 
that is, have these on our person, have them in our 
bedroom. 
We've met all the elements that are here for both 
counts. Count 2 is the same—same facts, same scenario, 
same elements, just that there are two knives. 
Now, the defense got up on the cross-examination 
of our witnesses and tried to make a distinction between 
Defense No.—or Defendant's Exhibit E and Defendant's F. 
And is there a distinction? Could they have charged him 
with this? Perhaps. Could I have said, well, there's some 
blades in here, is it a weapon? But I still use my common 
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sense as a prosecutor as well. This is a tool. 
Officer—or Agent Poor—Officer Poor, he called 
this a Leatherby, I believe. I don't even know what a 
Leatherby is. Looks like a unique kind of pair of pliers 
to me. Is there a distinction between that and these two? 
Absolutely. These are weapons. This is a tool. 
How about this one? Screw driver, some scissors, 
well, there's a blade on there, I guess you could clean 
your nails with that. Again, the distinction. A tool or a 
dangerous weapon? There is a distinction, that's why we 
didn't charge him with this stuff, because we used our 
common sense and we know the difference between a dangerous 
weapon and a tool. 
Dangerous weapon means any item that is, in the 
manner it's used or intended use is capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury. Think that could cause 
death, serious bodily injury? How about this one? Use 
your common sense. 
In construing whether an item, object or thing 
not commonly known as a dangerous weapon is a dangerous 
weapon, the character of an instrument, object or thing, 
the character of the wound, if any, and the manner in which 
the instrument, object or thing was used (inaudible) 
determinative. All you have to use in using your common 
sense to decide if these are actually tools or perhaps a 
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1 kitchen knife or can these inflict this kind of—of injury, 
2 serious bodily injury? 
3 No injury was inflicted on this case and we're 
4 not saying that—that officers were stabbed. We're just 
5 saying that this—these items could have done that and 
6 (that's exactly why he can't possess them because he hasn't 
7 shown that he can be responsible. 
8 Simply by possessing these, having them in his 
9 custody or control indicates that he's irresponsible. It 
10 also indicates that he's guilty of these offenses. 
11 I have the burden of proof. I'm the prosecutor 
12 and that's my job. I have to show that the defendant 
13 committed this crime, beyond a reasonable doubt. That he— 
14 that we met all of these elements beyond a reasonable 
15 doubt. 
16 Looking at the facts of the case. We—we had two 
17 witnesses testify; right? They went in to do a regular 
18 probation search because that's their job. They met the 
19 defendant outside, patted him down. No weapons. They went 
20 I in and did a search of the bedroom and these are the items 
21 that they found. 
22 How much more do you need? I don't think you 
23 need anything more. You have two officers, one with 
24 extensive service, one has service at the prison and now 
25 again as a probation officer, who find these and know that 
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1 I this is dangerous, this violates the law. 
2 I Did he intentionally or knowingly possess them? 
3 |Well, he admits to a kitchen knife and I used that, but is 
4 I it really a kitchen knife? He denies the folding knife, 
5 but yet, is the explanation reasonable to the officer? Oh, 
6 la friend gave it to me, but I don't know which friend. He 
7 never says to the officers, it's his, (inaudible) still in 
8 the bedroom. What other conclusion can you reach? 
9 Don't lose sight of common sense on this case 
10 because common sense tells you that the defendant is 
11 guilty. It doesn't take great thought. It doesn't take an 
12 endeavor into the philosophies of life. He's a man who was 
13 convicted of robbery, a convicted felon, and he's found 
14 with two knives in his bedroom. And there is no other 
15 evidence that suggests otherwise. 
16 And based upon that, I'm asking you to find the 
17 defendant guilty. Thank you. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Simms? 
19 MR. SIMMS: Yes. Thank you. 
20 You could leave it up there; can I use them? 
21 MR. ESQUEDA: Sure. 
22 MR. SIMMS: Thanks, Judge. Counsel. And I thank 
23 you and I know Mr. Kirkwood also thanks you for your 
24 patience today in listening to us. 
25 This case is about two things: Did Mr. Kirkwood 
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1 do something wrong and did he know it was wrong when he did 
2 it? No. I—I'd say no. Again, this case is just like 
3 ithose eggs you buy at the grocery store. You can't judge a 
4 book by its cover, you have to look a little bit deeper. 
5 Just like when you go to the store, you have to open up and 
6 I see if those eggs are cracked. 
7 It's interesting that we stipulated and admitted 
8 that Mr. Kirkwood is on probation and is a felon. It's 
9 never been an issue at all; but notice how many times the 
10 prosecution mentioned that in the closing argument. It's 
11 interesting that that's not even an issue and we've 
12 admitted that. That's totally something that he 
13 understands and he—he's a convicted felon and he can't 
14 I have a dangerous weapon. That's true; but everybody here 
15 said that they could give him the presumption of innocence. 
16 Just because he was convicted of a felony—no one raised 
17 their hand and said, Oh, because he's a felon, he's guilty 
18 of this as well. That's—that's not what we're here to do. 
19 He—he is on probation and you've heard his 
20 probation officers talk. He—he had the knife. He 
21 admitted having it; but what did he say? He was eating, he 
22 was eating with it, using it as a tool. Do you have any 
23 evidence that he wasn't? 
24 The probation officer herself said, well, sure, 
25 you can eat with a knife. No one said you can't. You can 
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have a steak dinner, you can—you're not supposed to eat 
like a savage now that you can't possess that and also you 
heard from Officer Poor. What did they say? That's not ray 
gym bag, that's not my knife. 
Have they provided you any evidence that this was 
his knife, that he knew of it? Was there anything else in 
that bag? Was there any mail that was his? Was there any 
clothes that were his? Was there anything else in that red 
gym bag? No. Just this knife. It could have been 
anyone's knife. 
If you look at those pictures and they—they are 
our pictures, we're not trying to hide anything, we're 
presenting all that evidence to you today and that's why we 
wanted to bring out those two leather tools, too. We want 
you to know everything that happened and we're not hiding 
anything and that's why we said he's on felony probation. 
We admitted that from the start. 
These other things, a washer and dryer. People 
have common access to that house, it's not a very big 
house. Other people had access to that room. It's not my 
knife. Is there any indication that it is? No. None at 
all. 
And let me look at what should be 5 and 6 on your 
jury instructions and the prosecution—prosecution made 
reference to this. And this is going to be 5 and 6—5 and 
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1 6 when you go back and deliberate. 
2 This is what he's charged with, we've admitted 
3 |that, we know who he is, he was on probation; but look at 
4 No. 2. (Inaudible) having possession. He never did 
5 anything, he said, Come on into my house, come on into my 
6 ! room. Sure, this is in his room. He admits that. 
7 He doesn't admit to this, but even assuming that 
8 they were—he knew about them, which he never stated that 
9 he knew about this and he stated—he said that's not his; 
10 but assuming that they meet that second burden, that he 
11 should have known or—or intentionally knew that it was 
12 there, it's—it's not a dangerous weapon. 
13 And let me point your attention to what we 
14 (inaudible) I believe No. 9, when you go back and you look 
15 at your jury instructions, look at the definition. You 
16 see, there's two different things going on and I think it's 
17 been confused. He's on—he's had a probation violation and 
18 then he has a new offense and that's what the prosecution 
19 called it, the new offense, and then there's two different 
20 things going on here, and this is possession or possessed, 
21 possession of a weapon. 
22 It's important not to get these two things 
23 confused. Probation officers usually—used to violate 
24 somebody based on probation. We're not talking about that 
25 he violated the terms of probation because he had a kitchen 
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1 I knife in his bedroom. That's not what we're talking about, 
2 | And that's, I think, a lot of the part where the probation 
3 jofficer's coming from. 
4 Now, is it a new offense? This is from the State 
5 Legislature, not from special rules that the—that A P & P 
6 I gets to determine, this is what the legislature says. And 
7 the legislature says, right here, it's 5 and 6, this is 
8 what they say you need to prove and you need to prove that 
9 it's a dangerous weapon. 
10 And what does the legislature say? They say, you 
11 know, if we had to list everything that was a dangerous 
12 weapon, I mean, the—the list would be endless; because if 
13 you think about it, how do you know what a dangerous weapon 
14 is? It's based simply on its use. 
15 Don't be—the prosecution is right. Don't leave 
16 your common sense at the courthouse steps. Use that—that 
17 common sense in, how is this used? A lot of things could 
18 be a weapon, like this pen. I mean, you could stab 
19 somebody in the eye, of course, that would cause serious 
20 bodily damage, it would cause injury; if you stab somebody 
21 in the neck in the right spot, he could die. So, are we to 
22 say, because this could be used as a weapon that Kirkwood 
23 can't hold a pen now? 
24 Or, are we to say that—and this often happens, 
25 people get in a fight, argument or whatever and they use an 
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1 automobile to run somebody over or attack them. That 
2 automobile is often used as a dangerous weapon and it's 
3 j treated as such; so because something has the potential to 
4 be a dangerous weapon, does that mean that he can't—he 
5 can't drive a car now? That we're going to limit the whole 
6 world? That he's going to just, I don't know, stay in a 
7 dark room or something and not exist and not live because 
8 he's a felon? No, he can live, he can eat, he can use this 
9 as a knife. Roberta said that he could, that he could eat 
10 a steak dinner, that he could play baseball, but he can't 
11 use that as a bat to injure someone. It's all about the 
12 use. And don't—don't leave that common sense behind. 
13 If he had a tool box in his room, other tools. 
14 You see what he's doing here, he has tools and this is just 
15 one of them. If you look at the definition of tools, 
16 (inaudible) you understand the definition of tools, a knife 
17 is included in that. A knife is included in that. And 
18 again, it's based on use because the State Legislature 
19 knows, every object could be a weapon; again, the pen, the 
20 car, the baseball bat. Everything could be a weapon, but 
21 it's not unless it's used in that fashion. 
22 Now, if he went out on the street, get into an 
23 argument with this knife, you know, and everybody's waiting 
24 for this knife (inaudible) it was just on the table, that's 
25 where it was. This—this weapon right here, if not used, 
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doesn't have interest, it has no power unless you give it 
that, unless you use it. 
Again, I think if you go back and you look at 
what the State Legislature demands you find, it's not a 
dangerous weapon, he didn't use it in that way, he used it 
in the way that one would use a tool, to eat with. Of 
course, it could be a weapon, but a lot of other things 
could be a weapon, too, and he can possess a pen, he can 
possess a bat, he can possess a car, but if he uses it in 
the wrong way, then he may be guilty of the offense. 
In America, the United States, you don't punish 
someone based on the potential, based on "this could 
happen", "this is a hypothetical." There was no injury 
here. The officers weren't harmed, there was no wound. It 
talks about that when you look at a dangerous weapon and 
(inaudible) item, object, how we know it's a dangerous 
weapon, the character of the instrument, object or thing, 
the nat—the—the character of the wound, if any, the 
manner in which the object was used, for eating, or a tool. 
So, it's sort of—you sort of judge a tree based 
on what type of fruit it bears. If—if you pull down an 
apple, then it's probable an apple tree and again, if it's 
not used as a weapon, then it's not a weapon. 
And it's—the Judge—the Judge opened it up—up 
this trial and said, the State has the burden of proof and 
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they do have the burden of proof. And he also talked about 
trial by ordeal and it sort of had, in the past, there's 
been a presumption that someone was guilty when they do 
something and that's what he's talking about, in a trial of 
ordeal, when they tied you in a sack and threw you in the 
river and if you drowned, well, then I guess you were—you 
were guilty. 
There's no presumption that someone has done 
something. I think that in this case, it's a tough fact 
that he's a—a felon and we—we admit that but don't hold 
that against him. Let him move forward with his life and 
he's done nothing wrong here. And just notice how many 
times that that fact is mentioned, when it's not even an 
issue, when we're already admitted that. 
And again, when you think about what the statute 
requires, it's not found here. He—he didn't use it as a 
weapon and it's not a dangerous weapon and please don't 
leave your common sense at the door. 
And my client is innocent and we do expect a—a 
not guilty verdict. 
THE COURT: Rebuttal, Mr. Esqueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Yes, your Honor. And since I do 
have the burden, I get two shots; okay? That's the way it 
works in our system. 
Interesting, he's charged in an Information—do 
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you all know what an Information is? It's a charging 
document. The Judge read you the preliminary instructions 
and that's how we do things in Utah. We could have a grand 
jury, call in a grand jury and present evidence and the 
grand jury decides whether we can charge someone. Or you 
can do it this way, which we commonly use, it's an 
Information. 
The Information alleges, Count 1, possession of a 
dangerous weapon by a restricted person. And I'm going to-
-I'm not going to read all of it 'cause you can read it 
back there; but it says that the defendant, Kent Karl 
Kirkwood, did have in his possession or under his custody 
or control, a dangerous weapon, to-wit: a knife, and that 
the defendant was on parole or probation for a felony. 
We've already dealt with the probation and felony 
stuff. Does it say anywhere in here that he has to use the 
knife? Anybody hear that? Because it's not there. He 
doesn't have to use the item. 
By their definition, he could freely walk with it 
in his pocket all folded up. Is that using it? There's 
nothing in this crime that says he has to use this item. 
It's possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person, not use of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
What they're talking about use is in regard to 
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how he described a dangerous weapon, two-fold. It's either 
by the use of that manner or by the thing's intended use. 
Okay? The manner of its use. Not how we use it, but what 
is this made for? How is this thing going to be used? Not 
that he used it; otherwise, it would be a different crime. 
It would be use of a dangerous weapon, not simply 
possession. 
And guess what? What is the common sensical use 
of this knife? Cutting steak? What is the common sense 
use of this particular item? Its manner, not how he used 
it, but what is it? And are we really using heavy—is he 
really cutting a steak with this thing? Look at the rust . 
on here, look at how it's been dulled or cut, feel this. 
Common sense. 
This is not a case of use, it's a case of 
possession and we've shown that because those things were 
found in his bedroom. 
Defense counsel gets up and says, Well, I can use 
this pen as a dangerous weapon. I could. But what is the 
manner of its use? The manner of its use is the thing 
itself, to write. And that's how you've got to compare 
these items with this item if that's the analogy he's going 
to use. 
You know, there—there are two types of evidence; 
direct and circumstantial evidence. I guess the direct 
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evidence in this case should be that the defendant, we 
caught him using the knife, attacking someone. We don't 
have that. In fact, we've never alleged that; but the 
circumstantial evidence is that we found those in his 
bedroom. 
And it reminds me of a story of my children, we 
have two boys, and we have a yard and it has a lot of dirt 
in it. And in the winter months, with rain and snow, it 
gets pretty muddy and we tell the boys to stay out of the 
mud. 
Well, my youngest, he—he minds pretty well. 
It's my middle child, it's always the middle child, my 
little problem child. I come home from work and there are 
footprints all up our stairs leading to our bedroom. I see 
a pair of shoes outside and I recognize that shoe—those 
shoes as my youngest child's, covered with mud. 
I look back up the stairs. And so what do I do, 
I yell out to my children: All right, who dragged mud into 
the house? And what do kids always do? I love it. "I 
don't know. I didn't do it". 
Okay. I'd love to meet this person "I don't 
know" because he does a lot of stuff in my house. So, what 
do I do? I follow the mud tracks up the stairs, into the 
hallway, down the hall and into a bedroom, which happens to 
be my middle child's bedroom. 
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Do I see the shoes there? No. No. The shoes 
aren't there, but there's mud—there's mud on his bedroom 
floor, on the carpet; of course, we have a light-colored 
carpet, that's why it's a big deal to not drag mud into the 
house. 
So, what do I do? I kinda look around now in the 
bedroom and this is what happened: My children never put 
their shoes away. But what happened this time? Where were 
the shoes? Put away in the closet. And what was on the 
shoes? The mud. So, what's the reasonable conclusion? 
That my middle child, circumstantial evidence, dragged mud 
into the shoes—or in—mud into the room on his shoes• 
Guess what? Same context applies. Okay? Where 
were they found? He did not have them in his possession, 
but there's mud all over the defendant's bedroom and it's 
sitting before you. 
Please convict him. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Counsel, approach. 
(Whereupon, an inaudible discussion was held at 
side bar.) 
THE COURT: I'm going to give you one additional 
instruction, members of the jury* In the instructions that 
I provide you, there really isn't a good way to distinguish 
between Count 1 and Count 2, but it so happens that the 
exhibits are—are marked Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 2. So, for 
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purposes of your deliberations, assume that Exhibit 1 
relates to Count 1 and Exhibit 2 relates to Count 2. 
Any questions about that? 
All right. Let's swear the bailiff. 
(Whereupon, the bailiff was duly sworn by the 
clerk of the Court.) 
THE COURT: Here's the instructions and each of 
the exhibits is there, so you're to take with you Exhibits 
1 and 2, C, B, E and F and I think that they're all right 
there. Why don't you close them up before you take them? 
And we'll stand as the—as the jury leaves us for 
what may be the last time. 
Be seated. 
Anything else, Counsel? 
MR. SIMMS: Judge, I guess there was one concern, 
although it—I—I'm not—I—it—it's there. Okay. We 
couldn't remember whether you instructed them to pick a 
foreperson, but it's in the instructions, so you must have. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right. Where are you going to 
be, Mr. Esgueda? 
MR. ESQUEDA: Well, wherever you want me to be, 
Judge• 
THE COURT: I want you to be where we can get you 
within—here within five minutes. 
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MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
it's a direct 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
awhile before 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
ESQUEDA: I'd be at my office. 
COURT: Can you do that within five minutes? 
ESQUEDA: I can. 
COURT: Do you have a cell phone? 
ESQUEDA: I don't. I have my office line, 
line to me. 
COURT: Okay. Make sure that Jill has that. 
ESQUEDA: Okay. 
COURT: Where are you going to be, Mr. Simms? 
SIMMS: I will probably stay here. 
COURT: All right. 
ESQUEDA: Did you want us to stay here for 
we leave? 
COURT: I think that's a good idea. 
ESQUEDA: Okay. 
COURT: And we will be in recess and will let 
you know as soon as we hear anything. 
(Recess.) 
THE 
matter of the 
present, both 
Ms. 
MS. 
THE 
MS. 
COURT: We are back on the record in the 
State of Utah vs. Kirkwood. Mr. Kirkwood is 
counsel are present and the jury is present. 
Kirby, are you the foreperson of the jury? 
KIRBY: I am. 
COURT: And you have a verdict, I understand? 
KIRBY: We do. 
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THE COURT: Would you please hand it to the 
bailiff? 
I'll ask the defendant to please rise. 
Possession of a—I'll read the whole thing. 
We, the jurors in the above case, find verdicts 
against the defendant, Kent Karl Kirkwood, as follows: 
Count 1, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, not guilty. 
Count 2, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, guilty. 
And it's signed by Ms. Kirby, the foreperson. 
Anybody request polling of the jury? 
MR. ESQUEDA: No, your Honor. 
MR. SIMMS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Anything else that we should do 
before we discharge the jurors? 
MR. ESQUEDA: I don't know of anything. 
THE COURT: All right. 
Members of the jury, we're going to thank you for 
your service at this time, for the day that you've spent 
with us and your efforts in resolving this case. 
The bailiff is going to show you one more time to 
the jury deliberation room. In just a moment, I'll come 
back there to meet with you and if any of you have any 
questions, I'll answer them and I'll thank you more 
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personally. 
Please stand as we excuse the jury for the last 
time. 
Be seated. 
Mr. Kirkwood, you've been found guilty of the 
charge of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted 
person. 
I'm going to request that prior to sentencing, 
that we receive a pre-sentence report from A P & P. I'm 
going to set this case for sentencing approximately 45 days 
out. Let's do that on March 12th at 8:30. That may be 
just over 45 days; you waive maximum time? 
MR. SIMMS: We would waive time, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Anything else, Counsel? 
MR. ESQUEDA: No, your Honor. 
MR. SIMMS: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: We'll be adjourned. 
MR. ESQUEDA: Thank you. 
(Whereupon, this hearing was concluded.) 
* * * 
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